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RED THREAD' OR SLENDER REED:
DECONSTRUCTING PROF. BARTHOLET'S
MYTHOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION
Johanna Oreskovic and Trish Maskewt
INTRODUCTION
In her recent piece, "International Adoption: Thoughts on Human
Rights Issues,"- Professor Elizabeth Bartholet leaves no doubt where she
stands: International adoption3 should be if not the preferred alternative,
then at least a preferred alternative for the "millions on millions 4 of chil-
t Johanna Oreskovic holds a J.D. from the University at Buffalo Law School,
where she taught a course on domestic and international adoption. She is an attor-
ney with the law firm of Rupp Baase Pfalzgraf, Cunningham and Coppola. Trish
Maskew is currently serving as a consultant to the Permanent Bureau of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law. Maskew is the Founder and former Presi-
dent of Ethica, Inc. a tax-exempt, non-profit organization dedicated to adoption
reform. She was previously employed as a program coordinator for an international
adoption agency and as a board member and administrator for the Joint Council on
International Children's Services. Ms. Maskew is an author of the newly published
Guide to Good Practice on the Implementation and Operation of the 1993 Hague
Intercountry Adoption Convention, for the Hague Conference on Private Interna-
tional Law; The Failure of Promise: the U.S. Regulations on Intercountry Adoption
under the Hague Convention, 60 AM. U. ADMIN. L. REV. 2 (2008); Child Traffick-
ing and Intercountry Adoption: The Cambodian Experience, 35 CUMB. L. REV. 3
(2005); and OUR OWN: ADOPTING AND PARENTING THE OLDER CHILD (Snowcap
Press 1999) . Maskew received her J.D. from American University.
I According to ancient Chinese belief, an invisible red thread connects those who
are destined to meet, regardless of time, place, or circumstance. The thread may
stretch or tangle, but never break. The red thread is the dominant image of interna-
tional adoption among American families who have adopted from China. See, e.g.,
Red Thread to Our Daughter, available at http://redthreadtomydaughter.blogspot.
com2007_04_01_archive.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2008); see also Nancy and
Dave's Journey to Parenthood, available at http://nancydave.blogspot.com/2008/
02/fcc-chinese-new-year-celebration.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
2 Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Thoughts on the Human Rights Is-
sue, 13 BuFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 151 (2007).
3 International adoption, also called transnational or perhaps more precisely, in-
tercountry adoption, is the process by which children who reside in and are citizens
of one country are adopted by parents who reside in and are citizens of another
county.
4 Bartholet, supra note 2, at 165.
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dren in the developing world who would otherwise be doomed to living out
their childhoods in damaging institutions or on the streets.5 She believes
that structuring legal regimes in ways that enable as many children as possi-
ble to avoid such fates should be at the core of any human rights-based
discussion of international adoption.6 But in Bartholet's view, this is not
the case. Instead, she maintains that discourse and policy-making on inter-
national adoption are controlled by a human rights community at worst hos-
tile to, and at best profoundly suspicious of, international adoption.7
Bartholet accuses this community, and particularly entities like UNICEF
and the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 8 of setting up legal, ideologi-
cal, and rhetorical roadblocks to international adoption. In her view, this
community's anti-adoption attitude is based on little more than naive ro-
manticism of "culture"9 and unreflective hostility toward a perceived
"colonialism" deemed inherent in transferring children from the developing
to the developed world.10 Bartholet contends that not only is this discourse
blind to the pragmatic realities of suffering children, it is based on overesti-
mates of abuses in the international adoption process.
For Bartholet, the facts and the solutions are straightforward. She
argues that international adoption offers perhaps the only reasonable alter-
native for millions of children in institutions and on the streets.12 Develop-
ing countries lack the resources and sometimes the political will to care for
children in need.13 Thus, Bartholet contends that domestic adoptions are
unlikely to occur in large number. 14 In the developed world, on the other
hand, significant numbers of would-be parents wrestle with infertility and
are increasingly open to building their families through international
adoption. 15
5 Id. For additional writings on international adoption, see ELIZABETH BARTHO-
LET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPrION AND THE POLITICS OF PARENTING Ch. 7 (1993);
Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Propriety Prospects, and Pragmatics,
13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 181 (1996); Elizabeth Bartholet, International
Adoption (Criminal Law and Urban Problems PLI Order No. 7583 2005).
6 See Bartholet, supra note 2, at 165, 176.
7 Id. at 152.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 180.
10 Id. at 154, 182.
11 Id. at 186-87.
12 Id. at 154.
13 Id. at 181.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 164.
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Bartholet dismisses the contention that monies that currently flow
into international adoption could instead be used to preserve families of
origin. 16 She further contends that even if such funds might be expended in
building foster or other systems of in-country care in developing coun-
tries, 17 the American example clearly demonstrates that foster care is, at
best, an inadequate alternative to placement in a permanent loving family. 18
For Bartholet the "goods" of international adoption consist of far
more than a fortuitous confluence of supply and demand best equilibrated
through a private ordering system. These "goods" include prospects for a
more just world, made possible by an increased willingness to build fami-
lies across races and cultures. 19 Adoptive families' increased awareness of,
and personal concern for, improving conditions in their child's country of
origin lead to humanitarian initiatives,20 which have had a significant posi-
tive impact on the welfare of children left behind.21 It is far less likely that
these initiatives would have occurred had adoptive parents not experienced
direct personal engagement with the plight of children in the country of
origin. For Bartholet then, international adoption is a "win-win" situation
for all involved.
Bartholet also argues that it is extremely unlikely that the "core
form of baby-buying," 22 actually occurs. Even if it does, she contends, "a
multitude of overlapping laws" provide a safety net to protect against
abuses. 23 She never specifies the exact nature of these laws, 24 or their rela-
tionship to the private agency-based adoption system through which most
16 Id. at 183.
17 Id. at 181.
18 See id. at 169-70, 181 (describing the U.S. Adoption and Safe Families Act
that rejects the "option of last choice status" for adoption and recognizes the impor-
tance of prompt movement out of the legal limbo of foster care).
19 Id. at 183.
20 Id. at 183-85 (noting that contributions to orphanages by American adoptive
parents of Chinese children in 2005 would have been close to $23,700,000).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 187 (Bartholet defines "core baby buying" as payments to birth parents
made to induce relinquishment).
23 Id.
24 Bartholet simply notes that "baby buying not only violates the laws of all send-
ing and receiving countries, but also a variety of international laws." Id. at 185 and
accompanying text. She does not cite to any law of any sending or receiving coun-
try, much less to the laws that she maintains exist in all countries. The international
Conventions she cites, see id., either are not self-executing or the United States is
not a party.
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international adoptive placements are mediated. Nonetheless, she argues
that this private agency system, though much-maligned by the international
human rights mainstream, 25 more effectively and efficiently meets the needs
of children than the central government controlled systems favored by the
international human rights community and institutionalized in the Hague
Convention on Intercountry Adoption.26 In Bartholet's view, enabling the
private system to function free of needless government oversight and bu-
reaucratic hurdles offers the most humane and realistic means of moving
children quickly into adoptive homes.27
Bartholet does admit that international adoption helps only a small
fraction of children 28 and that, at least to some extent, international adoption
involves a balancing of evils.29 But in contrast to the human rights main-
stream, she casts herself as a pragmatist, concerned with meeting the con-
crete needs of existing children. 30 She dismisses, as impractical and
misguided, the international human rights community's concern for con-
tinuity of culture and heritage. 31 Though she does recognize that the major-
ity of children in institutions and on the streets are not technically orphans
in the sense that both of their parents are dead,32 she contends that poverty
and economic dislocation make it unlikely that these children will ever en-
joy significant familial relationships.3 3 Nor, she argues, will these children
participate meaningfully 34 in the cultural life of their community of origin
(although she does not indicate what type of cultural experience is "mean-
25 Id. at 176.
26 Id. at 175-76.
27 Id. at 176.
28 Id. at 182.
29 Id. at 188. Bartholet contends that she grapples with issues of adoption abuses
and the actual impact of international adoption in improving child welfare, yet for
her, the balance clearly favors facilitating international adoptions. Bartholet
claims:
The opponents of international adoption never weigh the evils on
each side. Instead, they focus solely on the evils of adoption
abuses, and then argue for restrictive regulation to address those
evils. They don't consider the evils represented by failing to
place children in adoptive homes and the good that comes from
placing them.
30 Id. at 187.
31 Id. at 180.
32 Id. at 170.
33 Id. at 163.
34 Id. at 181.
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ingful"). 35 Under these circumstances, any damage caused by removing a
child from his or her culture is far outweighed by the advantages of a per-
manent home in another culture. She buttresses this contention by arguing
that, "[a]ge at adoptive placement regularly shows up in adoption studies as
the prime predictor of likelihood of successful life adjustment. '36 For
Bartholet, the facts demonstrate the utility, and indeed the humanitarian ne-
cessity, of moving marginalized children into adoptive homes as quickly as
possible.
Some of Bartholet's arguments are powerful and generally ac-
cepted. No right-minded person would quarrel with her claims that orphan-
age care significantly damages children or that the length of time they
spend in an institution is highly correlated with negative developmental out-
comes,37 even if a child is eventually placed in an adoptive home. Nor
would anyone seriously question Bartholet's observation that many sending
countries are unlikely, in the foreseeable future, to have the resources or
political will to build viable alternatives to institutional care. It is also true
that in the developed world, high infertility rates coupled with a high de-
mand for, and limited supply of, healthy infants for adoption make it likely
that more adoption-friendly legal regimes both in this country and abroad
35 Id. The question of what it means to participate in a culture is problematic.
Culture is defined as, "the characteristic features of everyday existence as diver-
sions or a way of life shared by people in a place or time." The Merriam-Webster
Dictionary (5th ed. 2004). No one would argue, for example, that American foster
children are culturally American, despite their lack of a permanent home, or for that
matter that children who grew up in American's orphanages of old were not cultur-
ally American. A child "participates" in a culture by virtue of his or her presence
within the culture. The quality and degree of participation, however, is much more
difficult to determine.
36 Bartholet, supra note 2, at 179.
37 For an excellent collection of resources, including clinical research studies on
the effects of institutionalization on learning, behavior, and social adjustments, see,
Association for Research in International Adoption, ARIA Table of Contents Page,
http://www.adoption-research.org/toc.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2008). See also,
e.g., Boris Gindis, Language-Related Problems and Remediation Strategies for In-
ternationally Adopted Orphanage-Raised Children, in INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, T. Tepper, et al. eds. (2d ed. 2000). Unicef has
also gone on record as stating that institutional placements should be avoided
where possible through creation of deinstitutionalization programs. See U.N. Chil-
dren's Fund [UNICEF], Int'l Child Dev. Centre, Intercountry Adoption, 4 Innocenti
Digest 11 (UNICEF ICDC, Florence, 1999).
2008
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might substantially increase the number of internationally adopted
children.3 8
The obvious questions, then, are why would human rights organiza-
tions and governments39 argue that international adoption should not be the
preferred alternative for homeless children? Why would they advocate that
instruments designed to regulate international adoption, like the Hague
Convention on Intercountry Adoption, focus more on eliminating perceived
abuses than on efficiently moving children into adoptive homes? Why
would they favor state regulation of the international adoption process over
a private system that places more infants, more quickly, into adoptive
homes? And why, given the likelihood that an impoverished and unpro-
tected child will be especially vulnerable to exploitation of the worst kinds
in his or her native culture, would the international human rights commu-
nity adopt such a limited, doctrinaire approach to questions of cultural
continuity?
Like Bartholet, we are international adoptive parents, and like
Bartholet, we place ourselves in the camp of those generally supportive of
international adoption. Where we part company with her is in our charac-
terization of the bigger picture. 40 Bartholet's position seems appealing be-
cause it relegates to the periphery of the analysis disturbing and problematic
questions that should be at its core, specifically troubling practices like
child-buying, coercion of vulnerable birth parents, weak regulatory struc-
tures, and profiteering. Our analysis breaks little new theoretical ground,
and we do not propose programmatic solutions. Rather we identify and
explore complexities that Bartholet for the most part ignores, but which are
central to the viability and integrity of any international adoption process.
To that end, we address the following questions: First, whether Bartholet's
claim that there are millions of adoptable children "in institutions and on
the streets" has sufficient empirical support to be credible? (Part I). Sec-
ond, to what extent does the private adoption agency system actually serve
the needs of children, maintain the integrity of the adoption process, and
protect the rights of children, birth, and adoptive families? (Part II) To
what extent do existing legal frameworks in sending countries and in the
US, specifically the Immigration and Nationality Act's (INA) orphan pro-
38 See Jacqueline Bhabha, Moving Babies: Globalization, Markets and Transna-
tional Adoption, 28 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFFAIRS, 181-82 (2004) (noting that,
"[tihe baby market reflects a crisis in family relations and economics: the inability
of birth families to sustain all their members and the inability of the modem, West-
em family to meet all its reproductive needs").
39 Bartholet supra note 2, at 157, 166-67.
40 Id. at 178.
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visions 41 and the Hague Convention, 42 provide the overlapping layers of
protection against abuses that Bartholet claims exist? (Part III) To what
extent does the available evidence support Bartholet's contention that
abuses like child buying, kidnapping, and coercion in international adop-
tions are over-estimated? (Part IV). And finally, is Bartholet correct when
she argues that issues of culture, heritage, identity, and integrity of process
should, in effect, be relegated to the background of any analysis of interna-
tional adoption? (Part V). We contend that the available evidence, while
clearly incomplete, offers virtually no support for any of Bartholet's
contentions.
PART I: MILLIONS ON MILLIONS?
Bartholet's starting point is an unsupported assumption that that
there are, "millions on millions" of children on the streets and in damaging
institutions 43 who are adoptable.44 This assumption can neither be proved
nor disproved with any certainty, particularly in the developing world,
41 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(b)(1)(F)(i) (2006).
42 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of In-
tercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134, [hereinafter Hague Conven-
tion]. The Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-279, 114 Stat. 825
(2000), codified at, 42 U.S.C. § 14901-56 (2008) [hereinafter IAA] is the imple-
menting legislation for the Convention.
43 Bartholet, supra note 2, at 158.
44 Other scholars of international adoption have argued that more empirical evi-
dence on the number of adoptable children is needed. See, e.g., Sara Dillon, Mak-
ing Legal Regimes for Intercountry Adoption Reflect Human Rights Principles:
Transforming the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child with the
Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 179, 187-88
(2003) (discussing what she terms the "adoptability conundrum" which she defines
as the difficulty of distinguishing between children who would be in the system of
orphanage care (in any event) from those brought into the system by the lure of the
profitability of international adoption who would not otherwise be in care). Dillon
argues, "[w]hat seems to be needed above all other interventions .... is an empiri-
cally-oriented, rigorous, objective search to identify who is in .... the child care
systems of each country, how that got there, and what options are truly available to
them." Id. In Dillon's view, what is needed are "findings of fact." Id. at 227.
Only in this way can we make accurate assessments about relative weight given to
human rights imperatives of moving children into adoptive homes vs. controlling
against abuses in international adoption. id.
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where an estimated forty million births go unrecorded each year.45 Hard
data simply do not exist on many children, making it difficult to determine
their legal status and hence, potential adoptability.
46
More seriously, adoptability is not a self-defining construct.
Bartholet, however, does not grapple with the complex and inconsistent le-
gal and cultural issues that need to be addressed to determine whether a
child is, in fact, adoptable.
47
To support her contentions, Bartholet relies on UNICEF estimates
of the number of orphans. 48 However, the UNICEF orphan figures are
problematic, at least in terms of demonstrating that a given child would
actually be free for adoption. UNICEF defines an orphan as a child who
has lost at least one parent to death.4 9 Under this definition, there are ap-
45 See, e.g., Plan UK, http://www.planuk.org/action/campaigns/birthregistration
(last visited Feb. 12, 2008). ("Every year, some 40 million children are born but not
registered, in other words, given no nationality, no official existence").
46 For instance, a USAID sponsored survey of the Cambodian orphanage popula-
tion in 2005 revealed that the majority of children in care population had no clear
legal status. USAID/Cambodia, CAMBODIA ORPHANAGE SURVEY, at 7, 12 (2005)
[hereinafter USAID Cambodia].
47 See, e.g., Hearing to Review Asian Adoptions to the United States: Hearing
Before the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcomm. of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, 108th Cong. 7-8 (2004) (statement of Thomas C. Atwood, Presi-
dent and CEO National Council for Adoption), available at http://www.senate.gov/
-foreign/testimony/2006/AtwoodTestimonyO6O6O8.pdf (stating that of countries
most devastated by 2004 tsunami, only India had an international adoption pro-
gram. Indonesia and Sri Lanka rarely allowed adoptions by US couples and in
Indonesia, only if the couple resided there for two years); Dillon, supra note 44, at
187 ("It is important not to confuse the concept of 'adoptable children' with that of
.children currently in out-of-home care'") (quoting Nigel Cantwell, Intercountry
Adoption: A Comment on the Number of Persons Seeking to Adopt Internation-
ally, 5 Judges' Newsletter (Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law) 70, 71 (2003)).
The United States' Immigration and Nationality Act has a highly specific definition
of orphan which permits children with one or two living parents to be deemed
orphans for the purposes of orphan visa petitions. See infra notes 106 to 110 and
accompanying text.
48 See Bartholet, supra note 2, at 183.
49 See UNAID et al., CHILDREN ON THE BRINK: A JOINT REPORT OF NEW ORPHAN
ESTIMATES AND A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION (2004) [hereinafter CHILDREN ON THE
BRINK] ("Total orphans are children under age 18 whose mothers or fathers (or
both) have died. The total number of orphans is equal to the sum of maternal or-
phans and paternal orphans, minus double orphans (because they are counted in
both the maternal and paternal categories)" [emphasis added]).
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proximately 143 million orphans in the developing world.50 However, an
estimated 88.7% of the 143 million have one living parent.51 Potentially,
then, the UNICEF orphan definition is over-inclusive, and thus misleading
because it does not specify whether the living parent is capable of providing
care for the child. In addition, even where a child has no parents or a living
parent incapable of providing proper care, many societies have well-estab-
lished extended family or community care networks that provide both short
and long-term care for children in need.
52
Bartholet does note that UNICEF reports that only 2.6 million chil-
dren are actually housed in institutions 53 and that this number may be a low
estimate. But she discounts UNICEF's contention that up to 80% of the
children in institutions in some countries actually have families and thus,
may not be eligible for adoption.54 Bartholet's claim that there are "mil-
lions" of adoptable orphans is furthered weakened by the fact that it is com-
mon practice in some countries for families to send children to orphanages
for schooling, short-term care through emergency situations, or other rea-
sons. 55 In some cases, these children have contact with their families of
50 Id. at 32.
51 Id. at 31 (noting that double orphans account for 16,200,000 of the 143,400,000
total orphans).
52 Bartholet, supra note 2, at 163; see also Children on the Brink, supra note 49,
at 9-10 (discussing the need for support for extended families and communities
who house orphans in Latin America and African countries). For an in-depth dis-
cussion of extended and community care networks among residents of Brazil's
shanty towns, see Claudia Fonseca, Inequality Near and Far: Adoption as Seen
from the Brazilian Favelas, 30 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 397 (2002).
53 Bartholet, supra note 2, at 183.
54 Id. at 194.
55 See, e.g., Howard E. Bogard, Comment, Who are the Orphans? Defining Or-
phan Status and the Need for an International Convention on International Adop-
tion, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 571, 605, 608-09 (1991) (noting that many children in
Romanian orphanages following passage of the 1990 law requiring parental con-
sent for adoption did not meet either the Romanian requirement for desertion or the
U.S. requirement for unconditional abandonment to an orphanage because, "they
were left for safe keeping by parents who plan to reclaim them later"); see also
David M. Smolin, Child Laundering: How the Intercountry Adoption System Le-
gitimizes and Incentivizes the Practice of Buying, Trafficking, Kidnapping and
Stealing Children, 52 WAYNE L. REV. 113, 199 and accompanying text (2006)
(citing studies on practices in Brazil and India which result in placement of children
of the poor in orphanages for, "education, food, housing and care without intending
to sever parental rights"); USAID Cambodia, supra note 46, at 6 (noting that of the
reasons given for referral to an orphanage, "other" ranked fourth on a list of 12
2008
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origin and there is no intent to relinquish the child permanently.5 6 Thus, the
western notion that placement in an orphanage is always synonymous with
intent to relinquish the child permanently simply does not comport with
reality in the developing world.
These facts, in turn, have important implications for international
adoption practice. Making determinations about whether a child has actu-
ally been relinquished permanently requires a much more searching investi-
gation than Bartholet's sweeping presumption that children living in
institutions will never enjoy significant family relationships. Accurate de-
terminations of adoptability that respect the rights of children and birth fam-
ilies require time and resources. The necessity and the inherent complexity
of making these vital determinations render simplistic Bartholet's conten-
tion that what institutionalized children need is a system that moves them as
quickly as possible to adoptive parents in the developed world.
Despite the fact that we do not know how many "orphans" -how-
ever the term is defined are actually adoptable, the evidence does show
clearly that at least in one demographic dimension, the characteristics of the
world's orphans differ significantly from those of children who are adopted
internationally. UNICEF and USAID estimate that approximately 88% of
the world's orphans are over the age of 5.57 But a review of the children
adopted by U.S. citizens over the last 11 years shows that on average, 85-
89% of the children adopted were under the age of 5.11 This disparity sug-
reasons. Of the factors listed in the "other" category, the largest number was for
education); Posting of Elizabeth Mallory, Mallory@nclo.org, to CambodiaAdopt
List@yahoogroups.com (Sept. 17, 2007) (copy on file with author) (as director of
Children's Home for orphan children, Mallory developed extensive, though anec-
dotal knowledge about Cambodia's post-suspension orphanage population. In this
post she states, "[e]very orphanage in Cambodia has children. Sometimes [sic] very
many .... But I would be willing to bet that the majority of the children in [Kep
orphanage] have either a mother, a father, or both").
56 Smolin, supra note 55, n.l 1 and accompanying text.
57 CHILDREN ON THE BRINK, supra note 49, at 14 (noting that over half were over
the age of 12, and that only 12 percent are under the age of 6).
58 Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 1996-
2006, available at http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm
[hereinafter DHS statistics]; U.S. Dep't of State, Immigrant Visas Issued to Or-
phans Coming to the U.S., BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, available at http://
travel.state.gov/family/adoption/stats/stats451 .html (last visited Feb. 12, 2008)
[hereinafter Dep't of State Stats]. Both DHS and the Dept. of State keep statistics
on adoptions. The only statistics publicly available from 1990-1995 are the Depart-
ment of State statistics on the top 20 countries for adoption each year. DHS statis-
tics, available from 1996-2006 reveal breakdowns of age categories (under 1; 1-4; 5
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gests that prospective adoptive parents in the U.S. view only a small frac-
tion of the world's orphanage population as "adoptable."5 9 It also suggests
that it is unlikely that children languish in orphanages primarily because of
anti-adoption sentiment or restrictive state policies but rather because they
do not satisfy the well-documented preference of adoptive parents for infant
and toddler girls.60 Finally, Bartholet's repeated assertions that children
who are not adopted will live and die in institutions and on the street
61
create a false dichotomy that appeals to the emotions but fails to take into
account that, without an adoption option, some children would likely re-
main with (or return to) their families of origin.
62
and over), and sex for each country, providing a much more complete picture. The
two sets of statistics rarely match exactly. The calculations and cites in this article
draw on both sets of statistics.
59 See, e.g., ILPEC GUATEMALA FOR UNICEF, ADOPTION AND THE RIGHTS
OF THE CHILD IN GUATEMALA at 18, 55 (2000) [hereinafter ILPEC Guatemala],
also available at http://www.iss-ssi.org/ResourceCentre/TroncDI/ilpec-unicef_
english report_2000.PDF (analyzing adoption figures from Guatemala and con-
cluding that parents generally prefer children under one. In contrast, the Guatema-
lan orphanage system is filled with older children).
60 John Gravois, Bringing Up Babes: Why do Adoptive Parents Prefer Girls,
SLATE (Jan. 16 2004), available at http://slate.msn.com/id/2093899 (last visited
Feb. 12, 2008) (noting that whether prospective adoptive parents are adopting from
China (where girls greatly outnumber boys), Russia (where the numbers are equal),
or Cambodia (where there is a, "glut of orphan boys and a paucity of girls," some-
where between 70 and 90 percent of prospective adoptive parents register, "some
preference for a girl with an agency"). See also, European Adoption Consultants,
About Us, available at http://www.eaci.com/info-center/about-us.htm (last visited
Apr. 29, 2008) ("Infants and toddlers are waiting for you. Their lives will be for-
ever changed through adoption by loving and caring couples. These wonderful little
children live in orphanages in Russia, China, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and
Guatemala").
61 See Bartholet, supra note 2.
62 This point will be discussed in greater detail in infra Part IV.
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PART II: THE PRIVATE AGENCY SYSTEM
63
The overwhelming majority of international adoptions are arranged
by private adoption agencies64 in the United States that match adoptive par-
ents with children overseas. 65 Adoption agencies routinely claim that they
exist to serve the best interests of children and to match children with par-
ents, not parents with children. 66  Some international adoption agencies
63 U.S. adoption law underwent a significant change on April 1, 2008 with the
entry into force of the Hague Adoption Convention. See U.S. Hague Convention
Ratification, available at http://travel.state.gov/family/adoption/convention/conven
tion 3900.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2008); see also Hague Convention, supra note
42; IAA supra note 42; Final Rules Implementing the Convention were issued by
the U.S. Department of State in February 2006. These rules, however, do not apply
to all adoptions. It is thus important for us to outline how adoptions have
historically been structured. The changes that will be effected under Hague rules
are discussed in Part III infra.
64 The alternative to an agency adoption is an independent adoption in which the
adoptive parents perform for themselves the functions of an agency. Needless to
say, relatively few parents have the time or resources to handle their own adop-
tions. In addition, some countries including China and Korea, prohibit independent
adoption altogether, leaving prospective adoptive parents with no choice but to use
an agency. The South Korean government has licensed four adoption agencies;
children are adopted through U.S. adoption agencies affiliated with the government
licensed agencies. See Adoption.com: Korea Adoption Overview, available at http:/
/korea.adoption.com/foreign/korea-adoption-overview.html (last visited Feb. 12,
2008); U.S. Dep't of State, Intercountry Adoption China, available at http://travel.
state.gov/family/adoption/country/country-365.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2008)
[hereinafter State Dep't China Adoption Information] (stating that the Chinese cen-
tral adoption authority, the China Committee of Adoption Affairs (CCAA) matches
Chinese children only with families working with a CCAA-licensed U.S. adoption
agency).
65 The family will obtain a required home study from a local provider, and then
contract with a placement agency that will locate a child abroad and facilitate the
entry of the child into the United States. See, e.g., JEAN NELSON-ERICHSON &
HEINO R. ERICHSON, HOW TO ADOPT INTERNATIONALLY 28 (2000) (noting that
most local agencies will provide a home study for adoption even though they will
not be able to refer a child from abroad, and that U.S. based international agencies
have child-placing contracts with foreign governments, attorneys, and liaisons in
foreign countries).
66 See, e.g., Global Adoption Services, Inc., Statement of Ethics, available at
http://www.adoptglobal.org/ethics.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2008) ("It is the re-
sponsibility of agencies or others involved in international adoptions to find fami-
lies for children, not children for families"); Caring Adoptions: Finding Families
for Children Since 1991, available at http://caringadoptions.org/AdoptionProcess.
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have long traditions of successful and ethical placements. They educate
adoptive parents and organize substantial child welfare programs in sending
countries. 67 However, whether an agency actively tries to implement best
practices is generally a matter of agency discretion, not law or regulation.
Under U.S. law, agencies are treated as market actors, not fiduciaries.
The international adoption agency system is structured in ways that
shift the lion's share of risk from the agency onto the adoptive parents.
Virtually all agency contracts contain broad exculpatory clauses absolving
agencies from liability for a child's medical condition68 and, more impor-
asp., (last visited Apr. 29, 2008); Families Thru International Adoption (FITA),
Mission Statement, available at www.ftia.org/aboutftia.asp#mission (last visited
Apr. 29, 2008):
Families Thru International Adoption is committed to providing
assistance to children around the world. When remaining or re-
uniting with the birth family is not possible, we work diligently to
find caring families who long to provide permanent, stable, and
loving homes for these children. We believe this to be our highest
calling.
Holt International, Introduction to Holt, available at http://www.holtintl.org/intro.
shtm (last visited Apr. 29, 2008) ("We consider each child's situation individually
to find the best long-term solution for that child. Because we also investigate the
possibilities of preserving the birth family or domestic adoption, you can be assured
that international adoption was the best solution for your child").
67 See, e.g., Jane Gross & Will Connors, Surge in Ethiopian Adoptions Raises
Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2007, at Al (detailing work of Children's Home
Society and Wide Horizons, which established programs, schools, and medical
clinics in Ethiopia).
68 A typical exculpatory provision reads as follows:
We release and discharge [the agency] from any and all causes of
action, claims, demands, damages, costs, loss of services, and ex-
penses that may arise, now or in the future, as a result of my/our
attempt to adopt a child. Our release includes, but is not limited
to, the potential claims set forth below. [The agency] will not be
held responsible for any mental and physical problems, which the
child is predisposed to or may develop in the future. Since adop-
tive parents have determined that the child is appropriate for
placement with them, full medical responsibility after the child's
placement and/or adoption is with the adoptive parents. It is not
the responsibility of [the agency] to assist in the termination of
the adoption nor will [the agency] assume custody of the adopted
child...
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tantly from a human rights standpoint, any aspect of the adoption process 69
Adoptions: Agreement of Understanding, Seattle International Adoptions (2000)
(on file with authors). Courts have upheld the validity of adoption agency exculpa-
tory clauses, at least with respect to wrongful adoption actions initiated by adoptive
parents. See e.g., Ferenc v. World Child Inc, 977 F. Supp. 56, 60 (D.D.C. 1997)
af'd, 172 F.3d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding validity of exculpatory clause in
contract between adoptive parent and agency and absolving agency from responsi-
bility for investigating health of children referred for adoptive placement); Dresser
v. Cradle of Hope Adoption Center, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d 620, 639 (E.D. Mich.
2005) (denying summary judgment for defendant adoption agency on negligence
claim by adopted child on grounds that he was not party to contract between par-
ents and agency and thus, not bound by the waiver provisions).
69 See, e.g., Contract of Adoptions from the Heart (copy on file with author),
stating:
The Adoptive Parent(s) hereby agree to waive liability against,
and hold harmless, each of AFTH and its successors, assigns, of-
ficers, directors, employees, owners, agents, volunteers, attor-
neys, representatives and corporate affiliates (collectively, the
"Released Parties"), and to fully and forever release the Released
Parties from any and all actions, causes of action, suits, debts,
accounts, liability, damages, attorney's fees, claims, counter-
claims, and demands whatsoever, whether arising in contract or
in tort, including claims for negligence, and whether in law or in
equity, which the Adoptive Parent(s) had, now have, or hereafter
can, shall, or may have for, upon, or by reason of any matter,
cause, or thing whatsoever arising out of or relating to an Interna-
tional Adoption Risk, and, including, without limitation, (a) the
political, governmental and administrative conditions in the for-
eign country; (b) any problems, delays, or failures relating to US-
International relations; (c) the medical, mental, social, emotional,
and developmental condition of the Child(ren); (d) the family
background, prior history and care and previous experiences of
the Child(ren); (e) any changes in the laws, regulations, policies,
or administrative requirements of the international placing coun-
try, the United States or the Adoptive Parent(s)' Country; (f) any
failure of any governmental or administrative judge, agency, offi-
cial, employee, or agency to approve or promptly process the
adoption; (g) war, terrorism, crime, acts of God, natural disasters,
or any other conditions, matters, or causes beyond the control of
AFTH; and (h) any or all of the risks set forth on Disclosure of
International Adoption Risks hereto. The Adoptive Parent(s) fur-
ther agree to indemnify each of the Released Parties for any
claims, costs, damages, or expenses incurred relating to, or aris-
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including whether a child placed for adoption will qualify for an orphan
visa, or even whether an internationally adopted child has been placed in a
safe home. 70 Agency fees are generally non-refundable whether the agency
succeeds in completing an adoption or not.71 Many international adoption
contracts contain "gag" clauses.72 Adoption agencies have actually com-
ing from, the occurrence of an International Adoption Risk, in-
cluding without limitation, unknown medical conditions of the
Child(ren). All hold harmless and other provisions contained in
this Paragraph, elsewhere in the Agreement, and the Attachments
thereto are each to be construed to have the broadest meaning
permitted by law.
70 See, e.g., Contract of Commonwealth Adoption (Jan. 2008) (copy on file with
author) stating:
Any child brought to the United States must qualify for entry
under applicable U.S. Citizenship and Immigration regulations
and obtain the proper documentation. Application to the USCIS
is the obligation of Family and while CAll shall provide Family
with assistance to evaluate the qualifications and the necessary
documentation, CAll cannot guarantee that every child will
qualify.
In addition, adoption agencies in the United States are not required by U.S. law to
ensure that post-placement reports required by many sending countries are actually
completed. This omission led to a tragic situation in which a five-year old Russian
girl, Masha Allen, was adopted by a single male who sexually abused her for over 6
years. The case raised the obvious question of how a child could have been al-
lowed to suffer in such horrendous conditions without any apparent social service
agency supervision. The resulting public outcry led to a Congressional investiga-
tion which revealed that the international adoption agency responsible for Masha's
placement fabricated at least one post-placement report and that no social workers
had ever visited the home to do follow-up reports. See Sexual Exploitation of Chil-
dren Over the Internet: Follow-up Issues to the Masha Allen Adoption: Hearing
Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on En-
ergy and Commerce, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://www.access/gpo./gov/
congress/house (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
71 See, e.g., Adoptions: Agreement of Understanding, Seattle International Adop-
tions, supra note 68 ([The agency] shall be compensated for its services prior to
travel. If the adoption is for any reason discontinued, fees paid or incurred for
services rendered up to the date of discontinuance shall not be recoverable and shall
remain the obligation of the Adoptive Parents); see also Commonwealth Adoptions
Contract, supra note 70 (stating, "the [f]amily understands that all payments made
during the term of this Agreement are earned in full at the time of payment and are
therefore non-refundable").
72 Building Blocks International Contract (on file with author):
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menced defamation suits against adoptive parents who have complained
about agency practices or services.
73
Adoption agencies in the U.S. rely heavily on in-country in-
termediaries, many of whom are unlicensed and whose activities are not
closely monitored by the agencies to locate children, complete adoption
paperwork, accompany U.S. parents to appointments with foreign officials
and the U.S. embassy, and sometimes obtain consent from the birth par-
ents.74 These intermediaries are not employees or agents of the adoption
agency; thus, the agencies assume no legal responsibility for their
facilitator's negligent or criminal acts. Adoptive parents, who are not in
The Adoptive Parent(s) shall not issue any false or misleading
communication of any kind or nature concerning Building Blocks
or any of its agents, servants, employees or foreign contacts (in-
cluding foreign representatives, foreign and domestic facilitators
and physicians). The restricted communications shall include but
be not limited to written, oral, internet posting, web sites or other
such mediums of communication. False or misleading communi-
cations shall include but not be limited to representations that
Building Blocks provided an unhealthy child (Building Blocks
does not guarantee the past, present or future health of the child
or the child's personality, learning disabilities, appearance or in-
herited characteristics) and communication concerning the length
of time an adoption required (each case is subjected to too many
foreign influences beyond the control of Building Blocks to guar-
antee a time frame for the completion of the adoption). In the
event of a violation of this paragraph, the Adoptive Parent(s)
shall be subjected to injunctive relief limiting the communica-
tions and liquidated damages in the amount of $3,500 for each
day in which an occurrence of this violation has been identified.
73 See, e.g., LaTrace v. Mosely, No. 04-4547-CI-13 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2007) (order
granting summary judgment for defendants dismissing plaintiff (adoption
facilitator's) defamation claims), available at http://www.ethicanet.org/Order-
GrantingLaTrace.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
74 Kristina Wilken, Controlling Improper Financial Gain in International Adop-
tions, 2 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 85 (1995); Telephone Interview between
Trish Maskew and Thomas J. DiFilipo, President and CEO, Joint Council on Inter-
national Children's Services (Mar. 4, 2007) (commenting that some agencies treat
overseas personnel as employees and that the employer/employee model could be
used by other agencies, but that the vast majority of overseas workers are indepen-
dent contractors, and noting that overseas agents of any variety, including employ-
ees, agents, facilitators, and attorneys, are key to the process of adoption and that
adoption would not be possible without the involvement of key personnel in the
foreign country).
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privity of contract with the facilitator, have no legal recourse against the
intermediary or the agency when things go wrong. 75 Agencies can, there-
fore, turn a blind eye to questionable and even illicit activities without suf-
fering legal exposure or consequences.
The fee structures and procedures that agencies employ are also
highly problematic. The fees charged for international adoptions are ex-
tremely high, often outlandishly so in relation to the per capita income of
sending countries. 76 A significant amount of the adoption fee is not for
specific services, as Bartholet contends, but is denominated a "country
fee."7 7 The country fees are paid to an agency's facilitators or by the
75 For example, in September, 2006, adoption facilitator, Amrex, Inc., declared
itself bankrupt, leaving over one hundred prospective adoptive parents with no chil-
dren and no refunds of payments made. The families had contracted with agencies
which, in turn, contracted with Amrex. The Amrex contract indemnified the
agency, and the agency contracts indemnified Amrex. The prospective adoptive
parents had no recourse against Amrex because they had no contractual relationship
with Amrex. See also, Michael Pearson, Adoption Services Firm Investigated over
Missing Funds, ATLANTA J, CONST., Oct. 3, 2006, at 3B; but see Dresser v. Cradle
of Hope Adoption Center, Inc, 358 F. Supp. 2d 620, 639 (holding that issue of fact
existed with respect to whether defendant adoption agency's coordinator in was an
"agent" of the adoption agency).
76 See, e.g., Children's Home Society and Family Services, Guatemala Adoption
Fees, available at http://www.childrenshomeadopt.org/GuatemalaAdoption Fees.
html (last visited Apr. 5, 2008) (listing Guatemala Country Program fees as
$20,000 to $21,000). Guatemala's annual per capita income is approximately
$2,400. World Bank, Key Development Data and Statistics (2005), available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,content
MDK:20535285-menuPK: 1192694-pagePK:64133150-piPK:64133175-theSite
PK:239419,00.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2008).
77 A Cambodian adoption in 2001 cost approximately $12,500, in a country with
an average per capita income of $200. Of this amount, $5,500 were "country fees"
and were not itemized. Cambodia, however, had no formal adoption fees. Govern-
ment Sentencing Memorandum, USA v. Lauryn Galindo, No. CR-03-187Z (W.D.
Wash 2004) [hereinafter Galindo Sentencing Memorandum] (statement of Dr. Kek
Galabru of the Cambodian League for the Protection and defense of Human Rights
(LICADHO)) (noting that "there are no Cambodian government fees for the
processing of adoption"). A Guatemalan adoption can cost over $25,000; of this
over $20,000 represents country fees. In Russia, the cost is $20,000 to $35,000,
with country fees ranging from $22,000 to $28,000. In China the total cost of an
adoption is $13,000 with approximately $8,000 being the country fee. Adopting
parents in China are also required to make a fixed "donation" of U.S. $3,000 to
$5,000 to the Children's Welfare Institute where the child was being raised prior to
the adoption. State Dep't China Adoption Information, supra note 64.
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agency to government authorities in the sending country. There is no re-
quirement that agencies itemize either the country fee or any other "service"
fees it charges.78 Often, fees are paid to foreign contractors on a per child
or per adoption basis rather than as a salary. 79 The prospect of earning large
amounts of money, none of which needs to be accounted for, on what
amounts to a contingency fee basis, creates significant incentives for indi-
viduals, particularly in desperately poor countries, to obtain children by any
means possible. This creates a profound absence of transparency at the most
critical level of the adoption process, making it virtually impossible to de-
termine how a child came into care and whether the process was free of
coercion, deception, or payments to induce relinquishment.
PART III. THE REGULATORY SCHEME
As we have seen, the private agency system is structured to maxi-
mize profit potential for the agency, while minimizing its legal exposure
and responsibilities to those it serves. Thus, the regulatory challenge, and
one of the major purposes of laws in the U.S. and foreign countries, must be
to police the private agency system and ensure the integrity of the adoption
process.
Bartholet argues, with no analysis of any specific laws, that there
exist overlapping layers of legal protection against adoption-related
abuses.80 Her position is curious because on the one hand, she argues that
these overlapping laws serve a positive function by ensuring the integrity of
the system. On the other hand, she is highly critical of central government
systems, which in her view create needless layers of bureaucracy that result
in children being housed in damaging institutions for far too long.8'
This section of the paper will demonstrate that the overlapping sys-
tem of legal protections that Bartholet mentions, but never analyzes empiri-
cally, simply does not exist. In Bartholet's view, Guatemala is a model
system because it moves young infants quickly through a private system,
78 Even under the Hague Convention, the foreign fee does not have to be itemized.
See 22 C.F.R. § 96.40 (agencies must disclose the, "expected total fees and esti-
mated expenses for all adoption services that will be provided in the child's Con-
vention country").
79 This practice is so prevalent that the Hague Regulations require agencies to pay
supervised providers on a salary basis or a fee for service basis rather than a contin-
gency fee. However, the fee for service/contingency fee requirements create a dis-
tinction without a difference because the end result is the same: remuneration is
received only if a child is placed. 22 C.F.R. § 96.34.
80 See Bartholet supra note 24, at 185 and accompanying text.
81 Bartholet, supra note 2, at 190.
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with minimal central government oversight or regulation. But, as we will
demonstrate, the evidence clearly shows that laxly regulated systems, like
Guatemala's, are particularly vulnerable to abuses, while centrally con-
trolled government systems do a better job of preventing child buying activ-
ities (though not necessarily against other abuses). 82 Finally, this section of
the article will demonstrate how the existing regulatory framework in the
United States does not effectively limit abuses or offer meaningful protec-
tion to children or families.
Foreign Country Systems
On the U.S. side, virtually all adoptions follow the same proce-
dures, 83 but there are significant differences in the laws and procedures gov-
erning international adoption in foreign countries. Countries generally fall
into one of two broadly defined categories: government controlled systems
and privately run systems. The main differences between the two types for
the purposes of our discussion are the manner in which the entry of children
into the child welfare system is controlled, and the point at which a child
intersects with a particular adoption agency that matches him or her with
adoptive parents in the U.S. It is at these stages that the process is most
vulnerable to abuse.
Government-controlled systems normally have offices specifically
tasked with facilitating and controlling adoption. Countries may create rules
82 In China, a government authority, the China Center for Adoption Affairs
(CCAA) oversees international adoptions. The U.S. views the Chinese system as
one of the most, "predictable, efficient, and transparent [systems]." Hearing on
Intercountry Adoption, Before the Subcomm. on East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Senate Comm. on For. Rel., 109th Cong. 5 (2006). See also Smolin, supra note 55,
at 124-25:
Significant sending nations many be divided into various groups.
One group of nations is generally free of child buying kidnapping
and trafficking, while a contrasting group of nations is mired in
recurrent child laundering and profiteering scandals. Thus, China
and South Korea generally have positive reputations. Cambodia,
India, Guatemala and Vietnam have suffered from significant
scandals involving child laundering. A third group of nations,
particularly including Russia, rarely suffer from child laundering
as their "orphans" are legitimately available for adoption. How-
ever, the adoption process in these nations is sometimes subject
to corruption, profiteering and bribery.
83 For discussion of adoption laws in the U.S., see infra notes 98 - 133 and accom-
panying text.
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about who can place children for adoption,8 4 and how children who enter
the foreign adoption process are assigned to agencies and parents abroad."
These countries may require efforts to maintain the child within the birth
family or to search for domestic adoption alternatives before placement
abroad.8 6 Adoption fees may be mandated by the government and more
84 For example, they may require U.S. agencies to prove they are licensed by the
state in which the agency is located. See China Center of Adoption Affairs, Basic
Requirements for Foreign Adoption Organizations, available at http://www.china-
ccaa.org/site%5Cinfocontent%5CZCFG_20050930040325140_en.htm (last visited
Apr. 6, 2008). Some countries, such as Russia, may also require that adoption
agencies be accredited by the foreign government. See Department of State, Russia
Adoption Information, available at http://travel.state.gov/family/adoption/country/
country_441.html (last visited (Apr. 10, 2008) ("Adoptive parents who work
through an adoption agency must use an agency that the Russian Government has
accredited to provide adoption services").
85 China has, arguably, one of the most tightly controlled adoption systems in the
world, and the China Center of Adoption Affairs (CCAA) is:
Responsible for selecting and placing adoptees for foreign adopt-
ers; making regular notifications of adoptees' status' communi-
cating with adoption registry offices in provinces in case that
problems arise during the course of registration; making studies
and proposing regulations of inter-country adoption work in wel-
fare institutions, making training courses and giving instructions.
CCAA, Basic Requirements for Foreign Adoption Organizations in Cooperation
with the China Center of Adoption Affairs, available at http://www.china-ccaa.org/
zxjj/zxjj index-en.jsp (last visited Apr. 9, 2008). This central referral system elim-
inates private agency contact with local orphanages that have proven problematic in
other countries. Id. In the Philippines, the central adoption authority, the Intercoun-
try Adoption Placement Committee, matches children with families. U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, Intercountry Adoption: Philippines, available at http://travel.state.gov/fam-
ily/adoption/country/country_437.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2008).
86 For example, see Russia's requirement that children be available for domestic
adoption for six-eight months before being offered for international adoption. U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, Intercountry Adoption: Russian Federation, available at http://
travel.state.gov/family/adoption/country/country_44 1.html (last visited Apr. 9,
2008):
The Russian government maintains a database of children with-
out parental care. Russian law requires that a child be registered
first on a local databank for one month and a regional data bank
for a month plus six months on the federal databank. Therefore,
the total amount of time before a child is released for interna-
tional adoption is usually eight months.
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tightly regulated than in the private system,8 7 although issues of trans-
parency remain problematic. 88
By contrast, in countries without centrally controlled processes, in-
tercountry adoption often operates in an ad hoc fashion: laws and proce-
dures are poorly defined89 or non-existent. In such systems, U.S. agencies
and their overseas contacts may enter into placement agreements with pri-
vate orphanages. These agreements may include monthly or annual support
of the orphanage in exchange for exclusive rights to place any children
housed there for adoption. 90 In countries where no orphanages or other
87 See, e.g., The Philippines, which mandates the following fees: Adoption Appli-
cation Fee, US $200.00 (non-refundable upon endorsement of the Adoption Appli-
cation and Supporting Documents); Processing Fee US $2,000.00-for all
categories (regular, relative, special needs children); Pre-travel Expenses-The cost
of the passport, visa, medical examination, psychological evaluation, travel ex-
penses of the child within the Philippines and for abroad (the cost varies on a
country to country basis); US $1,000 Child Care Support Fund for the Child Caring
Agencies. Republic of the Philippines, Frequently Asked Questions: How to Adopt
a Child, available at http://www.gov.ph/faqs/adoption.asp (last visited Apr. 9,
2008).
88 Smolin, supra note 55, at 125-26 (noting that in Russia, abuses in child pro-
curement are relatively rare, but there is little transparency about where the fees
paid to Russian intermediaries or the Russian government actually go). Similarly,
according to Bartholet's estimate, American adoptive parents send over $23 million
dollars in orphanage donations to officials in China. See Bartholet, supra note 2, at
183-85. Bartholet assumes that all of those funds benefit Chinese orphanages, but
the CCAA does not document or itemize how orphanage fees are expended. Al-
though anecdotal reports indicate that some donations have been used to improve
conditions in some orphanages, it is unclear what percentage of the required orphan
donation directly benefits institutionalized children.
89 See, e.g., Cambodian Subdecree of 2001, available at http://www.cambodia
adoptionconnection.com/rules and regulations.htm (defining criteria for selection
of adoptive parents, but containing no provisions defining the circumstances under
which a child can be relinquished for adoption or procedures for determining
whether relinquishment was voluntary or made by a parent of guardian, not a third
party).
90 For example, placement agreements are common in Vietnam where agencies
provide aid and assistance to orphanages and are specifically licensed to work in
certain provinces. This practice has proved problematic when agencies began "out-
bidding" each other for referrals, leading the Joint Council on International Chil-
dren's Services to propose voluntary standards requiring agencies to work
cooperatively in establishing such agreements. See Joint Council on Int'l Children's
Services, Standards of Practice for Vietnam, §§ 3.02, 6.01, available at
http://www.jcics. org/Standards % 20of% 20Practice % 20for% 2OVietnam.pdf., U.S.
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state institutions exist, U.S. agencies may build or fund orphanages or de-
velop a network of foster homes. 91 The U.S. agencies or their foreign agents
may have direct contact with birth families, accept consents, and prepare
paperwork to file for termination of parental rights and for adoption.
92
Adoption fees in such countries are generally market-based and are often
set by the agents that contract with U.S. agencies. 93
Countries with strong central government systems are relatively
free of child buying abuses and have rarely attracted the attention of the
human rights organizations. Indeed, six countries with centrally controlled
systems, China, Russia, the Philippines, India, Columbia, and the Republic
of Korea have lengthy (15-17 year) histories of steady to slightly increasing
Embassy, Summary of Irregularities in Adoption in Vietnam (April 25, 2008)
[hereinafter Vietnam Embassy Report] available at http://vietnam.usembassy.gov/
irreg-adoptionsO42508.html ("According to DIA [Vietnamese Department of In-
ternational Adoption], orphanages are required to refer one child for foreign adop-
tion for every x dollars donated by the ASP [adoption service provider]. Thus, if
the ASP funds a $10,000 project and the per-child donation is set at $1000 per
child, then the orphanage would be required to refer 10 children for intercountry
adoption to the ASP).
91 In Guatemala, private intermediaries such as adoption attorneys have developed
a network of private foster care. See Bartholet, supra note 2, at 190. See also, e.g.,
Dillon International, Inc., Haiti Adoption, available at http://dillonadopt.com/Haiti-
A.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2008) (describing collaboration with sister institution
The Foundation for the Children of Haiti, which built complex to care for the wait-
ing children including the Rainbow Of Love Nursery, School of the Good Sower,
and Hope Children's Hospital; Vietnam Embassy Report, supra note 90 (noting
that "one orphanage, which is entirely funded by an American ASP submits ex-
pense reports and receipts to the ASP on a monthly basis. The ASP then transfers
funds to reimburse the orphanage for its expenses").
92 See, e.g., infra, note 192 and accompanying text (detailing preparation of adop-
tion paperwork by facilitators in Cambodia).
93 See, e.g., Vietnam Embassy Report, supra note 90 (noting that "several orphan-
age directors have told the Embassy that they actively bargain with multiple ASP's
and choose to work with the ASP that offers the highest donation per child
referred").
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numbers of placements. 94 Together, these six countries account for 82% of
all adoptions by U.S. citizens from 1990-2006. 9'
It is only in laxly regulated systems that human rights organizations
have voiced significant concerns about adoption abuses. 96 These systems
often lack legal and statutory frameworks to police child buying, provide
mechanisms for parents to locate and reclaim abducted children, or control
bribery and money laundering.97 The statistics clearly show that centrally
controlled systems do a far better job of both controlling illegal activity and
providing homes for children, than the loosely regulated systems, like Gua-
temala's, whose virtues Bartholet extols.
Where no foreign controls adequately address adoption abuses, the
burden of regulating adoption falls to the receiving country. In this respect
U.S. law, at both the state and federal levels, creates far more gaps than it
closes, rendering Bartholet's contentions about the existence of an overlap-
ping safety net of laws suspect.
U.S. State and Federal Regulation
Regulation by U.S. States
Although domestic adoptions are regulated at the state level, the
existing state licensing system is not designed for, nor in most cases does it
94 China (16 years of steadily climbing rates before a small decrease in 2006 for
total of 62906, with a high of 7906 and low of 61 (in its first year) for an average of
3932); Russia (15 year history of relatively steady growth until decreases in the last
two years for total of 52940, with a high of 5865, and low of 324 (in its first year)
for an average of 3530); Philippines (total 4469, low 163, high 421 and average of
263); India (total of 6996, low of 320, high of 543 and average of 412; Colombia
(total 5819, low of 231, high of 631 and average of 343); S. Korea (low 1,376,
high 2,620, average over the 17 year span for which statistics are available (1990-
2006) was 1,793 for a total of 30,476). Together these six countries account for
82% of all adoptions by U.S. citizens from 1990-2006. Of these six, only India has
been the subject of significant concern by local NGOs. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S.
Adoption Statistics (1990-1995), and DHS Statistics (1996-2006).
95 See U.S. Dep't of State, supra 94.
96 For a more detailed discussion, see infra Part IV.
97 See, e.g. Dateline NBC: To Catch a Baby Broker, available at http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/22756856/ (NBC television broadcast Jan. 20, 2008) (detailing
adoption irregularities in Guatemala, including the story of a family whose three
daughters were kidnapped and placed for adoption. The family filed a complaint
with local police who did not provide assistance or investigation in locating the
missing children); see Vietnam Embassy Report, supra note 90 (outlining how
Vietnamese officials were unable to control rampant corruption).
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effectively regulate, the agencies involved in international adoptions. 98 For
instance, international adoption "agencies" do not need to be licensed at all
in some states, nor, in some states is there any requirement that agencies
operate as not for profit enterprises. 99 Only three states have specific licen-
sure requirements for international adoption. 10 0 Moreover, licensing re-
quirements vary widely from state to state and seldom cover the most
problematic issues in inter-country adoption. 1 1 For instance, only two
states require that agencies provide educational background information on
their overseas employees. 10 2 Perhaps most importantly, no state requires
98 Presentation of Elena Langrill, Asst. Attorney General, MD, at the Adoption
Ethics and Accountability Conference, October 16, 2007 (outlining a lack of con-
sumer protection and licensing provisions dealing with international adoption) (au-
dio recording available at http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/events.)
99 Some so called "agencies" are actually adoption facilitators, not social service
agencies. For example, the State of California allows for profit adoption facilitators
to be licensed as businesses rather than adoption agencies. See CAL. DEP'T OF SOc.
SERV. ADOPTIONS SUPPORT SERV., Registry of Cal. Adoption Facilitators, available
at http://www.childsworld.ca.gov/res/pdf/RegistryAdoptionFacilitator.pdf (last vis-
ited Apr. 13, 2008).
100 See Cal. Fain. Code § 8900 (2007). California: "Intercountry adoption services
shall be exclusively provided by private adoption agencies specifically licensed by
the department." But see Cal. Dep't of Soc. Serv. Adoptions Support Serv., supra
note 99 (allowing facilitators to operate without licensure); Colorado:
The department is authorized to select nonpublic, licensed child
placement agencies authorized to handle adoptions or nonpublic
agencies that meet the qualifying criteria to be licensed child
placement agencies pursuant to article 6 of title 26, C.R.S., and
any implementing rules or regulations promulgated by the depart-
ment for the provision of services to individuals seeking assis-
tance in nonpublic agency interstate or foreign adoption cases
pursuant to this part 2. The department shall, by rule, establish
qualifying criteria by which such nonpublic agencies shall be se-
lected for this purpose.
COLO. REV. STAT. 19-5-205.5(2)(a) (2008): "If approved by the Administration, the
agency may provide services related to an international adoption." MD. CODE
REGS. 07.05.03.18(A); see also
101 For example, no state mandates that adoption fees must be refundable if ser-
vices are not rendered and no state prohibits blanket waivers of liability.
102 See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE 56.670(g) (2007): "An agency providing intercoun-
try adoption services shall verify the credentials and qualifications of agents in
foreign countries working in the agency's behalf on adoption matters"; UTAH AD-
MIN. CODE R.501-7-l19(D)-(2007)- "A child placing adoption agency that provides
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agencies to take legal or contractual responsibility for the acts of their over-
seas employees and contractors. 103
U.S. Federal Regulation
As of April 1, 2008 when the Hague Convention on International
Adoption 1°4 entered into force in the U.S., two distinct bodies of law at the
federal level govern international adoptions. Adoptions between the U.S.
and Non-Hague countries are governed by the Immigration and Nationality
Act's orphan regulations; adoptions between the U.S. and Hague signatories
are governed by the Hague Convention and the U.S. implementing legisla-
tion, the Intercountry Adoption Act (IAA). 10 5
Immigration and Nationality Act
In adoptions between the U.S. and non-Hague countries, the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act (INA) is normally the only federal law gov-
erning international adoption.106 The INA provides an incomplete, and often
ineffective, means of regulating international adoptive placements. The
most significant problem is that there is no provision in the INA or else-
where in the federal statutory scheme that criminalizes the purchase of chil-
dren or trafficking in children for the purposes of international adoption. 1
0 7
intercountry adoption services shall verify and maintain documentation regarding
the credentials and qualifications of agents working in their behalf in foreign
countries."
103 See Ethica, Adoption Regulation Research Project, Preliminary Results (April
15, 2008) (on file with author) (finding no state regulations specifically require
such vicarious liability provisions).
104 See Hague Convention, supra note 42; see also IAA, supra note 42.
105 See Thomas E. Cook: Acting Assistant Commissioner of Adjudications Divi-
sion, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE: IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Memo-
randum for All Regional Directors: Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000 (Jan. 17,
2001) (outlining conditions under which IAA will govern international adoptions
and when INA's orphan definition will control) (on file with author).
106 The INA's orphan definition governs the determination of whether the child
will receive a visa to enter the U.S. See 8 CFR 204.3 (2003). While some federal
laws regarding document fraud, money laundering, or other crimes can have appli-
cability to adoptions, the INA is the only law impacting every international adop-
tion to the U.S.
107 In 2000, the United States passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1466 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8, 18, and 22 U.SC.). The act criminalizes a number of human trafficking offenses,
but not trafficking for purposes of international adoption. For an in-depth discus-
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In adoptions between the US and non-Hague nations, the only de-
termination made at the federal level is whether the prospective adoptive
child satisfies the Act's orphan definition and qualifies for an "Immediate
Relative Visa" to enter the US. 1° 8 In every other aspect of the adoption
process, the law of the marketplace governs. For instance, though the INA
does require prospective adoptive parents to meet specific standards to
sion of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, see Developments in the Law, Jobs
and Borders, The Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2180
(2005). For an excellent historical survey of international conventions that define
human trafficking, as well as an in depth discussion of the indeterminate nature of
these definitions, particularly as they may (or may not) apply to international adop-
tions, see David M. Smolin, Intercountry Adoption as Child Trafficking, 39 VAL.
U. L. REV. 281 (2004):
On the one hand, buying children and sending them across na-
tional boundaries would seem to meet the dictionary definition of
"trafficking in children," even if done as part of an adoption. On
a linguistic and intuitive level, buying and selling children would
seem to be included in any plausible definition of "child traffick-
ing." On the other hand, the various international legal definitions
of slavery, practices similar to slavery, and trafficking seem to
generally require something more than the sale of a human being,
and that "something more" is not met by sending the child across
national boundaries. These legal definitions of slavery and slav-
ery-like practices, and trafficking seem to require intent or an act
harmful to the person enslaved or trafficked. The victim must be
made a slave or servant, subject to force or exploitative labor,
sexually exploited, or involuntarily married. And generally
speaking, the law would not characterize being adopted as harm,
let alone harm equivalent to these serious forms of exploitation.
108 8 U.S.C. l101(b)(1)(F)(i) (2006). The statute defines an orphan as:
a child under the age of sixteen at the time a petition is filed in
his behalf to accord classification as an immediate relative under
section 1151(b) of this title, who is an orphan because of the
death or disappearance of, abandonment of desertion by, or sepa-
ration or loss from, both parents, or for whom the sole surviving
parent is incapable of providing proper care and has in writing
irrevocably released the child for emigration and adoption.
If a child is not deemed an orphan, the Immediate Relative Petition must
be denied. For a discussion of the procedural requirements for visa denial see infra
note 111 and accompanying text.
The INA's orphan definition is cumbersome and conceptually dense. For
instance, in its advice to adoptive parents on "Difficult Issues in Orphan Cases,"
USCIS notes:
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The laws of some countries do not permit adoption. Laws of
other countries restrict persons eligible to adopt children. There
are children legally adopted abroad who do not qualify as or-
phans according the U.S. immigration laws (see definition of or-
phan in Appendix B). The adoptive and prospective adoptive
parent(s) should be aware that NOT ALL CHILDREN ADOPTED
ABROAD ARE ORPHANS, and what appears to be a foreign adoption
may not comply with the laws of the foreign state; and some
valid foreign adoptions are not sufficient to classify the adopted
person as a "child" under U.S. immigration law.
It is the responsibility of the petitioner [adoptive parents] to prove
to the USCIS that a child is eligible for classification as an or-
phan for immigration purposes. The evidence must be in the form
of documents. This evidence may vary, depending on the facts of
the case (emphasis added).
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Difficult Issues in Orphan Cases,
available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/diocase.htm (last visited Mar. 29,
2008). See also Sara Goldsmith, A Critique of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service's New Rule Governing Transnational Adoptions, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1173
(1995) (noting that adoptive parents have the burden of proving whether an adopted
child satisfies this complex definition).
It should also be noted that the vast majority of international adoptive
parents do not retain attorneys to assist them with this part of the process, but
instead, rely on foreign intermediaries, discussed in Part II infra, none of whom are
regulated by US law and the majority of whom have no training in US immigration
or state adoption law. More seriously, as discussed in the previous section, defini-
tions of orphan status and adoptability differ across cultures. In testimony before
Congress in 2002, then INS Commissioner James M. Ziglar noted that a significant
risk faced by American adoptive parents was that the child they adopted might not
qualify for an orphan visa, thus rendering the adoption for all intents and purposes a
nullity. Ziglar's testimony is noteworthy because he shed light on the lack of trans-
parency in some country's adoption systems and the ways in which lack of trans-
parency interacts with and can fuel corruption:
The most serious problem with international adoptions is that in
many countries, the process by which governments decide that
birth parents are no longer providing care for their child and that
the child is available for intercountry adoption is not always
transparent.
As a consequence, some American prospective adoptive parents
have experienced the heartbreaking situation in which they have
traveled abroad and adopted a child, only to discover that the
child does not meet the orphan definition and cannot immediately
immigrate to the United States. For example, sometimes a foreign
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adopt (including the requirement of a home study by a qualified social
worker), 109 there are no conduct requirements for the professionals who fa-
cilitate those adoptions. The INA does not establish fee parameters, require-
ments on who can facilitate adoptions for U.S. agencies, or contractual
arrangements between agencies and families or foreign partners. 110 In ef-
fect, then, the INA fails to regulate all of the most essential and potentially
problematic aspects of the international adoption process.
The INA addresses the question of child trafficking for purposes of
adoption obliquely (and inadequately) in the Federal Regulations governing
adjudication of Immediate Relative Petitions. Section 204.3 of the Regula-
tions stipulates that:
[A]n orphan petition must be denied ... if the prospective
adoptive parents or adoptive parent(s), or a person or entity
working in their behalf, have given or will give money or
other consideration either directly or indirectly to the
child's parent(s), agent(s), other individual(s), or entity for
the child or as an inducement to release the child."1 '
The Regulation, therefore, does not criminalize or otherwise penal-
ize child buying, it merely imposes the administrative penalty of visa de-
nial.11 2 The regulation does not address the real evil because it does not
country allows Americans to adopt a child who is not an orphan
because their laws are different than ours. Sometimes, particu-
larly in poor and underdeveloped countries, unregulated and un-
scrupulous agents and facilitators take advantage of inadequate
infrastructure and safeguards to lead American prospective adop-
tive parents to believe a particular child is an orphan when a pro-
fessional review of the paperwork reveals serious problems and
irregularities.
Hearing on International Adoptions: Hearing Before the House Committee on In-
ternational Relations (testimony of James M. Ziglar), 107th Cong. 4 (2002), availa-
ble at http://www.uscis.gov.files/testimony/lZIGHOUS.pdf ) (last visited Feb. 12,
2008).
109 8 C.F.R. 204.3(c)(2) (2003).
110 See, e.g., Wilken, supra note 74, at 87 (noting that "U.S. adoption laws" fail to
regulate payments made by adoptive parents of a child to the child's birth parent or
to an adoption intermediary").
11 8 C.F.R. § 204.3 (g)(14)(i) (2003).
112 The administrative penalty is USCIS's denial of the orphan petition. Adoptive
parents have a right to appeal at the administrative level, as well as a right to
judicial review after exhaustion of administrative remedies. However, adoptive
parents bear the burden of proving that their child was properly relinquished with-
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provide sanctions against individuals who may have induced or coerced
birth parent consent through improper payments. Instead, under current
law, the innocent parties -adoptive children and parents- are penalized
by denial of an immigrant visa for the child while perpetrators suffer no
consequences at all.
The Hague Convention
The Hague Convention has the potential to remedy some of the
defects in the current INA framework. The IAA does penalize child buying
and other forms of coercion in adoptive placements.113 Thus, the Hague
Convention (which Bartholet contends has been hijacked by the interna-
tional human rights community and turned into a barrier to international
adoptions, especially in countries like Guatemala) 114 is the only instrument
out monetary inducements. This often entails undertaking private investigations in
the sending country, as well as great emotional and financial cost to the adoptive
parents, not to mention the adoptive child, who cannot emigrate and who may face
being placed back into an institution, should the adoptive parents appeal be unsuc-
cessful. See, e.g., In re [redacted], Petition to Classify Orphan as Immediate Rela-
tive, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Administrative Appeal, Tampa,
Florida Office (Oct. 20, 2003) (public copy with identifying information deleted to
prevent invasion of privacy), available at http://www.uscis.gov (last visited De-
cember 22, 2004) (denying self-represented adoptive parents appeal of Notice of
Intent to Deny Immigrant Visa on grounds that child was not surrendered to state
run orphanage, private orphanage or other competent authority prior to adoption
and thus, did not qualify as an orphan under the statute) (copy on file with author) ;
In re [redacted] Petition to Classify Orphan as Immediate Relative, Ho Chi Minh
City, Vietnam Office (Mar. 7, 2003) (public copy with identifying information de-
leted to prevent invasion of privacy), available at http://www.uscis.gov (last visited
December 22, 2004) (reversing Officer in Charge's determination that child did not
meet orphan definition on grounds that even though person who relinquished child
to orphanage was not child's mother, insufficient evidence existed that child had
been relinquished by parent for specific adoption and that sufficient efforts had
been made to locate birth parent).
113 IAA, supra note 42; 42 U.S.C. § 14944 (2000).
114 Bartholet, supra note 2, at 154. Bartholet argues that:
International human rights organizations succeeded in changing
the focus of the Hague Convention negotiations so that [the goal
of facilitating international adoptive placements] was eliminated
and the thrust became more single-mindedly focused on prevent-
ing adoption abuses... the Hague Convention seems, to date, to
have functioned in numerous instance to effectively close, not
open, opportunities for adoption.
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in U.S. federal law that will actually criminalize child trafficking for the
purpose of international adoption. 115 The U.S. regulations implementing
the Convention also create an accreditation scheme to regulate adoption
agencies. 116 Whether the Hague Convention will in fact improve current
practices, is however, very much in doubt.
First, the Convention applies only to adoptions between signato-
ries. 117 Currently only about half of the countries involved in international
adoptions with the U.S. will be subject to the Convention." 8 Second, and
more seriously, the Convention's implementing regulations were heavily
influenced by the adoption agency community in the United States, with the
result that important protections envisioned by the Convention have been
all but eviscerated. 119 For example, adoption fees can still be non-refund-
115 42 U.S.C. § 14944 (2000).
116 See 42 U.S.C. § 14921(a)(l)-(2) (2000):
Except as otherwise provided in this title, no person may offer or
provide adoption services in connection with a Convention adop-
tion in the United States unless that person (1) is accredited or
approved in accordance with this subchapter; or (2) is providing
such services through or under the supervision and responsibility
of an accredited agency or approved person.
117 Hague Convention, supra note 39, Art. 42, provides:
The Convention shall apply where a child habitually resident in
one Contracting State ("the State of origin") has been, is being, or
is to be moved to another Contracting State ("the receiving
State") either after his or her adoption in the State of origin by
spouses or a person habitually resident in the receiving State, or
for the purposes of such an adoption in the receiving State or in
the State of origin.
118 The Convention is not in effect in Russia, South Korea, Vietnam, Ethiopia,
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Liberia, Haiti, Taiwan, Nepal or Nigeria, eleven of the top
twenty source countries for U.S. adoption in 2006. Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Status Table, available at http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act
=conventions.status&cid=69 (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
119 The Department of State issued a proposed set of regulations on September 15,
2003 and received some 1,500 comments in response, most from adoption agency
personnel objecting to particular standards. Maura Harty, Asst. Secretary of State
for Consular Affairs, Department of State, Remarks at Holt International Confer-
ence, Looking Forward, Getting it Right, October 2006 (stating that the final regu-
lations were "the product of considerable research, interagency coordination, and
input from the adoption community - including roughly 1,500 public comments,
which we painstakingly reviewed and considered").
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able,120 agencies can still shift all risk to the adoptive parents, 121 and "coun-
try fees" still do not require itemization.
122
While a full discussion of the U.S. regulations implementing the
Hague Convention is beyond the scope of this article, a few salient issues
must be addressed to refute Bartholet's claims about the IAA's protection
against abuses. As noted above, the IAA provides for civil and criminal
penalties for child trafficking activities. 123 However, the regulations which
address child buying also make it legal for agencies and their overseas
agents to pay monies for, inter alia, locating a child for adoption, pre-natal
and living expenses for a pregnant woman before the birth of a child, ex-
penses for the mother and child following the birth, as well as medical,
legal and translation costs. 124 While some believe that because most U.S.
states allow such expenses, they should be allowed overseas, it must be
noted that there are protections here in the United States that are not present
in other countries. Significantly, in 49 of 50 U.S. states, the payment of
expenses does not obligate a pregnant woman to place her child for adop-
tion. No such protections exist under the IAA regulations.125 This is partic-
ularly problematic because the solicitation of children for adoption is a
major problem in some countries. These payments may be dubbed "ex-
penses" but often these payments greatly exceed any expenses the families
in developing countries would incur during the pregnancy and birth.
126
Such payments can, therefore, have substantial coercive effects; indeed, it is
120 22 C.F.R. § 96.40(a) (2006):
The agency or person provides to all applicants, prior to applica-
tion, a written schedule of expected total fees and estimated ex-
penses and an explanation of the conditions under which fees or
expenses may be charged, waived, reduced, or refunded and of
when and how the fees and expenses must be paid).
121 22 C.F.R. § 96.39(3)(d) (2006) (providing that agencies can do so only where
the waiver complies with State law, but no state outlaws them).
122 22 C.F.R. § 96.40(b)(3) (2006) (requiring agency to disclose only the "total fees
and estimated expenses for all adoption services that will be provided in the Con-
vention country").
123 42 U.S.C. § 14944 (2000).
124 22 C.F.R. § 96.36 (2006).
125 Id.
126 See, e.g. Ethica, "Child Trafficking, Why Can't the Immigration Service Prove
It?" available at www.ethicanet.org/INSEvidence.pdf (outlining case in which a
Vietnamese birth mother was paid an equivalent of 125% of the annual per capita
income as "'expenses"); see also infra, notes 203 and 204 and accompanying text,
outlining problems with payments to birth families in Guatemala.
2008
102 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 14
difficult analytically to view them as anything other than a legalized way to
pay indigent families for their children.
The permissible fee provision of the new regulations interacts in a
dangerous way with two other problematic provisions. First, the Conven-
tion expressly states that compensation to adoption service providers must
be "reasonable. ' 127 Yet, contrary to the purposes of the Convention and the
IAA, 128 the U.S. implementing regulations do not base reasonableness de-
terminations on the cost of living in the child's country of origin or the cost
of comparable legal services in that country. Instead, the regulations re-
quire that agencies keep their fees reasonable in relation to the norms for
the inter-country adoption community. 129 In other words, agencies can
charge as much as the market will bear, provided all other agencies are
doing the same.
Finally, while the Hague regulations lay out a complicated accredi-
tation scheme that purportedly holds agencies accountable for adoptions,
there is a broad exception to the regulation's vicarious liability provisions.
This exception has the potential to undermine a number of the regulation's
protections. In section 96.14 of the Hague regulations, agencies are in-
formed that they must supervise all foreign providers of services unless the
provider obtains the consent to adoption or writes the child study report on
the potential adoptee.130 Arguably, this exclusion enables agencies to avoid
legal responsibility for facilitators and agents who perform these func-
127 Hague Convention, supra note 42, art. 32 (stipulating that no one should derive
improper financial gain from an activity related to an intercountry adoption and that
adoption personnel should not receive compensation that is "unreasonably high in
relation to services rendered.; Id. art. 8 (requiring each country's Central Authority
to take "all appropriate measures" to prevent improper financial gain).
128 Id.; see also 146 Cong. Rec. H6389 (July 18, 2000) (statement of William D.
Delahunt) (noting that documented abuses in intercountry adoptions range from the
charging of exorbitant fees by so-called "facilitators" in some countries to child
kidnapping, baby smuggling; and coerced consent from birth mothers).
129 See 22 C.F.R. §96.34 (2006) (requiring agencies to ensure that fees paid to
directors, officers, employees, and supervised providers of the agency are not un-
reasonably high in relation to services rendered, "taking into account the country in
which the adoption services are provided and norms for compensation within the
Intercountry adoption community in that country").
130 See 22 C.F.R. § 96.14(c)(3) (2006). The child study is a particularly significant
piece of any adoption because it details the circumstances surrounding the child's
relinquishment. See Hague Convention, supra note 42, art. 16 (listing requirements
of child study report, including information about [the child's] identity, adoptabil-
ity, background, social environment, family history, medical history, including that
of the child's family, and any special needs of the child").
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tions.' 3' The State Department has stated it will not allow agencies to inter-
pret section 96.14 as a loophole to enable agencies to avoid supervising
(and thus responsibility for) their overseas agents. 132 It remains to be seen,
however, whether the unsupervised provider liability exclusion will become
an exception to agency responsibility that swallows the rule. 133 Thus, these
three provisions, alone or in combination, may actually legitimize activities
that amount to child trafficking.
At the federal level, then, the framework within which international
adoptions take place lacks significant safeguards. Although adoption agen-
cies are subject to accreditation requirements under IAA, as the discussion
above makes clear, the Act's implementing regulations may not signifi-
cantly change - and at least in the area of permissible payments to birth
families, may actually increase - problematic aspects of the market-driven
system. In addition, over half of the most popular countries for U.S. adop-
tion are not governed by the Hague scheme. Thus, there is simply no evi-
dence supporting Bartholet's claims that a safety net of any kind exists for
any member of the adoption triad in countries without centrally controlled
systems.
These issues would be less problematic if it were possible to state
with Bartholet's confidence that adoption abuse is, in fact, rare. However,
as the next section of this article will demonstrate, Bartholet's confidence is
misplaced.
PART IV ADOPTION ABUSES
Bartholet argues without support that adoption abuses like kidnap-
ping and child buying occur infrequently. 34 In her view, human rights or-
131 22 C.F.R. §96.46(c) allows agencies to "verify" these items were done in accor-
dance with the Convention through "document review" and other unspecified
means, but do not have to take supervisory responsibility for the agents.
132 Email from Katherine E. Monahan, Chief, Hague Intercountry Adoption Unit
Office of Children's Issues, U.S. Department of State to Trish Maskew, President
& Linh Song, Executive Director, Ethica, Inc. (Dec. 07, 2007) (on file with author).
133 For a detailed discussion on the supervised provider exemption, see Trish Mas-
kew, The Failure of Promise: The U.S. Regulations on Intercountry Adoption
under the Hague Convention, 60 AM. U. ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming June, 2008)
(copy on file with editors).
134 The historical data, however, suggest otherwise. Allegations of widespread
adoption abuses first emerged in Latin America in the 1980's and 1990's and in
Romania in the early 1990's. See. e.g., Jorge L. Carro, Regulation of Intercountry
Adoption: Can the Abuses Come to an End, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
121, 131-41 (1994). Carro details adoption abuses in Peru (1992) in which an
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American attorney was arrested by Peruvian authorities and the special prosecutor
found evidence that an American attorney "falsified birth records, bribed judicial
officials, bought children from mothers for as little as $5, outright kidnapped some
children and allegedly ran three day-care centers where poor working mothers were
pressured to sell their children." The attorney and the American agencies with
which he worked denied allegations. See U.S. DEPT OF STATE, Travel Advisory
No. 91-252 (Dec. 27, 1991) (advising travelers of adoption problems in Peru).
Carro also notes that Brazil implemented restrictions on intercountry adoption after
rumors of baby selling surfaced. In 1992, evidence that senior government officials
were involved in baby trafficking resulted in the Honduran government closing its
international adoption program. See Michael Riley, Deceit Takes Babies Away in
Honduras; Adoptions: Poor, Illiterate Women in Honduras Are Easy Prey for
Lawyers Serving as Brokers for U.S. Couples Seeking to Adopt, Balt. Sun (July 2,
1998). In the early 1990's well-documented reports of a Romanian "baby bazaar"
surfaced. Carro notes that many prospective adoptive parents realized that large
numbers of children in Romanian orphanages were either HIV or Hepatitis B posi-
tive; abortions, which had been illegal under the Ceacescue regime, increased in
1990, further decreasing the number of available infants. As a result, many
Romanian parents realized that they could, in effect, sell their child to the highest
bidders. This led to an increase in the number of baby brokers. Id. at 148. The
activities of the brokers were documented by New York Times reporter Kathleen
Hunt. See The Romanian Baby Bazaar, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1991 (Magazine).
See also 60 Minutes Broadcast, Apr. 14, 1991 (documenting Romanian baby trade).
See Bogard, supra note 52, at 608-09 (noting that 1990 Romanian adoption law
requiring parental consent to adoption helped to create burgeoning black market in
adoption of Romanian children. The number of children in orphanages decreased;
foreign adoptive parents began to rely on baby brokers, who preyed on the poverty
of Romanian families to induce them to relinquish their healthy children to foreign
adoptive families for as much as the equivalent of several years of wages. Con-
cers about adoption irregularities in Romania continued throughout the 90s and
early 2000s despite several revisions to adoption procedures. More recently, as will
be discussed in greater detail, infra Part IV, credible (and in the case of Cambodia,
substantiated) reports of similar patterns of adoption abuses have surfaced in nu-
merous countries.
Interestingly, Bartholet minimizes the significance of the Romanian adop-
tion scandals, contending that:
[T]he evil represented by the fact that some impoverished
Romanian birth parents accepted money incidental to relinquish-
ment of their children, with there likely being only a handful who
were motivated by money to relinquish children they otherwise
would have kept is miniscule, in my opinion, by comparison to
the evil represented by the thousands of Romanian children con-
demned to live and die in horrible institutions, who could have
had loving, nurturing adoptive homes.
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ganizations have greatly overestimated the incidence and significance of
abuses within the overall picture of international adoption in order to further
their own anti-adoption agendas. 13 5 Interestingly, Bartholet does admit that
payments to birth parents do sometimes occur. 136 But she rationalizes these
payments by creating a distinction between payments made to induce relin-
quishment and humanitarian assistance provided after relinquishment. 137
The distinction is meaningless because the known possibility of assistance,
whether pre or post relinquishment, has the same effect: It creates an incen-
tive to relinquish, 38 particularly when the birth family is destitute or in cri-
sis. 139 By minimizing the ethical significance of payment in connection
with relinquishment Bartholet can then cast the human rights community's
legitimate concern with the integrity of process as mere anti-adoption
sentiment.
Interestingly, however, the human rights community has voiced
significant objections to international adoption in only a small fraction of
countries, 140 most of which share characteristics which, as we will show,
Bartholet, supra note 2, at 188-89. While no one disputes the tragedy of children in
Romanian institutions, Bartholet provides no empirical support for her claims about
the frequency and impact of payments made by baby brokers to Romanian birth
parents. Moreover reports of the Romanian baby bazaar made it abundantly clear
that in many cases, the children being adopted were not, and had never been, part
of the Romanian orphanage population.
135 Bartholet, supra note 2, at 186-87.
136 Bartholet, supra note 2, at 186-87.
137 Bartholet, supra note 2, at 186-87.
138 Smolin, supra note 55, at 127 (noting ethical ambiguities of payments to birth
parents and manner in which payments are made create problems drawing useful
distinctions between "lawful relinquishment and illicit purchase of a child").
139 Bartholet goes on to make the argument that payment to gestate children for the
purposes of international adoption is "what we call surrogacy." See Bartholet,
supra note 2, at 188. But in fact, this is not the case at all. Where surrogacy is
permitted, it is generally viewed as a gratuitous transfer whose promises cannot be
enforced contractually. Where contractual surrogacy is recognized, it is premised
upon the capacity of the parties to contract. Such capacity cannot be presumed if
the birth mother is, as Bartholet herself admits, so poor that she simply does not
have a choice. Bartholet, supra note 2, at 187.
140 In 2004, Ethica published, The Statistics Tell the Story, available at http://www.
ethicanet.org/item.php?recorded=statistics (last visited Apr.12, 2008) (finding that
over past 15 years, of 40 top 20 countries of origin for U.S. adoptions, 13 were
currently closed or effectively closed, an additional 4 were closed reportedly tem-
porarily, to investigate concerns or establish new procedures, with the total of 17
countries accounting for 43% of the 40). Vietnam has since reopened. These coun-
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make international adoption programs particularly vulnerable to abuse. We
do not intend to imply that all adoption service providers in these countries
are participating in abusive adoption activities. Rather, the characteristics of
these countries make them particularly ripe for abuse by those who do en-
gage in such activities.
Though an in-depth discussion of human rights abuses in interna-
tional adoption is beyond the scope of this article, 14 1 the available evidence
strongly suggests that international adoption abuses follow a remarkably
consistent and predictable cycle in country after country. The countries in
which significant international adoption abuses have been alleged and docu-
mented - Latin America in the 1980's, Romania in the early 1990's, Cam-
bodia in 2000-01, and now Vietnam and Guatemala - often suffer from
extreme poverty or have recently emerged from war or social unrest. As a
result, these countries often lack child welfare infrastructures of any but the
most basic kinds.
142
Absence of child welfare infrastructures results in a lack of basic
safeguards against illicit child procurement practices: births are not re-
tries had adoption numbers ranging from 79 to 1122. Id. Romania and Peru were
the only countries to ever exceed 500. The average was 307. Id. It should be noted
that, according to the author's calculations based on the USCIS statistics, even if
such countries had continued at their highest levels until the present, it would only
have raised the total number of children adopted by approximately 40,000 over the
17 year period from 1990-2006. These additions would have amounted to about
15% of all adoptions. As noted in note 94, six countries account for 82% of all
adoptions and have remarkably steady numbers for 15-17 years. Countries that
have closed after human rights allegations were, thus, a small percentage of the
total number of adoptions over the years, lending further weight to the contention
that state run systems do a better job of both curtailing abuses and placing children.
See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. Adoption statistics (1990-1995), and DHS Statistics
(1996-2006).
141 For a comprehensive survey and analysis of human rights abuses in interna-
tional adoption, see Smolin, supra note 55.
142 ILPEC Guatemala, supra note 59, at 48 (quoting director of US adoption
agency with program in Guatemala, a country which suffers from extreme poverty
and had only recently emerged from decades of civil war, stating that, "Guatemala
is one of the few countries in the world - if not the only one in which the legal
possibility exists of formalizing an adoption without mediation by a judicial resolu-
tion." (quoting Revista Domingo, Prense Libre, Oct. 5, 1997, at 10). ILPEC con-
cludes that "[t]hese circumstances have, in large measure, generated the widespread
trafficking of Guatemalan children,"; Smolin, supra note 55, at 126 (noting that
countries with significant child laundering problems typically have "a large propor-
tion of the population lives in or near extreme poverty").
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corded, 143 the state does not intervene to investigate abduction or the sale of
children, 144 and it lacks the resources to provide care for vulnerable popula-
tions. When these problems are coupled with dire poverty and the lure of
large amounts of western money, it is not at all difficult to see how re-
sourceful entrepreneurs can easily procure, by all manner of illicit means,
the kinds of children who will satisfy market demand.
Historically, word of fast, easy placements of infants and toddlers
spreads and such countries become "hot spots" for international adoption. 1
45
Typically, the children offered for placement will have characteristics val-
ued by American adoptive parents1 46 and may not be representative of the
country's population of legitimate orphans. The number of children
adopted begins to spike rapidly and more and more agencies become active
in the country.
147
143 See Plan UK, supra note 45 and accompanying text.
144 Dateline, supra note 97 and accompanying text.
145 Currently, Vietnam and Ethiopia are the international adoption "hot spots." US-
CIS has reported receiving 2000 1-600A applications stating intention to adopt from
Vietnam (where the highest number ever adopted in one year was 820 (2007));
Ethiopian adoptions rapidly escalated in number between 2003 to 2007, showing
166, 277, 430, 711 and 1,255 adoptions respectively.
146 U.S. visa statistics show that 84-89 percent of all adoptions are for children
under the age of 5. Most of these children are actually under 18 months because
Chinese children tend to be between one year to 15 months at arrival. See Ralph
Stirling, China Referral and Age Statistics, available at http://chinastats.org/stat-
sdisplay.htm#WAIT (last visited Apr. 12, 2008). Americans also tend to prefer to
adopt girls. See Gravois, supra note 60; Ethan B. Kapstein, The Baby Trade, 82
FOREIGN AFF. 115, 119 (Nov/Dec/ 2003) (stating that stopping the baby trade in
international adoption will be "no small feat..." Infants can fetch anywhere be-
tween $5,000 and $25,000). China tends to skew the male/female ratio for adoptive
placements because nearly all Chinese adopted children are girls. When China is
removed from the U.S. visa statistics, the male/female ratio remains close to 50/50
over the 10 year span from 1996-2006. In countries that experience significant
problems, children tend to be very young. For example, over the three year period
of 2004-2006, children under age of one totaled 40-42% of adoptions across all
countries. However, Guatemalan children were under the age of 1 in 65% (2004);
79% (2005) and 80% (2006) of the cases. During their peak years, Vietnam aver-
aged 75% under the age of one, with 62% being female; Cambodia averaged 65%
under the age of one, even with the considerable processing delays, and rising per-
centages of girls: 51% in 1999, 54% in 2000 and 63% in 2001.
147 Smolin, supra note 55, at 126 (identifying a second factor that characterizes
countries with child laundering problems: "the nation sends a sufficient number of
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Although practices differ somewhat from country to country, the
typical scenario involves some sort of recruitment scheme in which locals
identify poor pregnant woman who may be willing to consent to adoption.
These recruiters offer to pay parents compensation for releasing their child
for adoption. 148 Often the payments are characterized as reimbursement of
"expenses" for the pregnancy and birth or as humanitarian aid. 149 Recruiters
may promise the birth family that the child will return, that the adoptive
parents will send money to the birth family, or that the child will someday
sponsor the family for immigration to the U.S. 150 The recruiter then deliv-
ers the child to an orphanage or foster home and receives compensation.
Facilitators or attorneys who act as intermediaries between U.S. adoption
agencies and the foreign orphanages, in turn, compensate orphanage direc-
tors or child recruiters for each child referred. 51 Stateside agencies com-
pensate the facilitators, often at rates grossly disproportionate to the per
children for intercountry adoption to enable it to become a significant sending na-
tion"). Id. at 123-33.
148 See infra, notes 203-04 and accompanying text (regarding the use of jaladores
in Guatemala); infra, notes 184-95 (outlining child buying in Cambodia); see Viet-
nam Embassy Report, supra note 90 (noting that in 75% of cases investigated,
parents reported receiving expense reimbursement and an additional sum of money
for consenting).
149 See, e.g., Vietnam Embassy Report, supra note 90 ("in five provinces, the Em-
bassy discovered unlicensed, unregulated facilities that provide free room and
board to pregnant women in return for their commitment to relinquish their chil-
dren upon birth"); see also Ethica, supra note 126 and accompanying text.
150 The U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia recently raised concerns about contact between
adoptive parents and birth parents and the issue of promises of support and contact,
which might violate U.S. law. Email from Paul Cantrell, Consular Section Chief,
U.S. Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to adoption agencies, Jan. 23, 2008 (on file
with author). In Vietnam, some families are being promised that the child will
return at age 11 or 12 or will send support. Vietnam Embassy Report, supra note
95. Associates of adoption facilitator Lauryn Galindo made promises of support,
contact and emigration to destitute parents in Cambodia as an inducement to relin-
quish their children. Richard Cross, Rushton Distinguished Lecture Series - Re-
forming Intercountry Adoption: Present Realities and Future Prospects, Samford
University, Cumberland Law School (Apr. 15, 2005), [hereinafter Cross Lecture],
audio and video available at http://cumberland.samford.edu/cumberland-programs.
asp?ID=630 (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
151 See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, Backgrounder, Operation
Broken Hearts (Nov. 19, 2004), available at http://www.ethicanet.org/galindo-
backgr.pdf. (last visited Apr. 12, 2008)(outlining Cambodia recruitment scheme);
see Vietnam Embassy Report, supra note 90.
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capita income of the sending country. 5 2 In some sending countries, bribes
are paid to government officials to produce false paperwork or to obtain
approvals for adoption.153
As the popularity of the country increases, competition for available
infants becomes more intense. Government officials and NGOs raise con-
cerns about adoption abuses, often leading to investigations and changes in
procedures. In virtually all cases, however, the outcome is the same: the
sending country closes its adoption program for a time (or sometimes com-
pletely), 154 or the United States acts by denying visas (as we are seeing in
Vietnam today), 155 or by stopping the adoption process entirely, as it did in
Cambodia in 2001.156
152 See generally Sara Corbett, Where Do Babies Come From?, N.Y. Times, Mag-
azine, June 16, 2002, available at http://query.nytimes,com/gstfullpage.html?res=
COOEEDF113DF935A25755CoA9649L (last visited Feb. 12, 2008) (Director of
the Asian Orphan Association, Serey Puth, received $6,900 per child placed
through his partner agency in the U.S.). Current fees to adoption facilitators in
Vietnam range from $12,000 to $14,500. See International Child Foundation, Inc.
fee schedules, available at http://www.childfound.org/vietnam-adoption.html); see
also Adoption International, available at http://www.adoptionintemational.net/pro-
gram vietnam.shtml (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
151 Documents Point to Bribes in Adoption Scandal, Cambodia Daily (Aug. 6,
2004) (reporting that Lauryn Galindo paid approximately $3,500 of the $10,500-
$11,500 she received in adoption fees to "clerks, employees or officials to facilitate
the adoption process in Cambodia"). The report goes on to note that "[i]f the fee
was standard for each adoption, as court documents suggest, Cambodia officials
may have profited $2.45 million during the time Galindo operated in Cambodia.
Id.; see also, Adoption Official Convicted of Bribery, The Independent, Dec. 31,
2002, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qn4158/is_20021231/ai_n12
663313 (a court sentenced an Italian citizen for bribing Russian adoption officials);
Dateline, supra note 97 (where adoption facilitator admits that it was previously
possible to pay Guatemalan officials $1,500 to get paperwork processed).
154 Ethica, supra note 140. Ethica research found that in a fifteen-year period be-
tween 1988 and 2003, "40 different countries were in the Top 20 Countries of
origin for U.S. families." Of these 40 countries, 13 were closed in 2003 and another
4 were temporarily closed. Therefore, of the top 40 countries from which US citi-
zens adopted from 1988-2003, 43% were closed. According to Ethica's research,
"[v]irtually all of these countries closed due to concerns about rampant corruption
or child trafficking and abduction." Id.
155 Elizabeth Olson, Families Adopting from Vietnam Say They are Caught in Dip-
lomatic Jam, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 2008, at A14.
156 Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Servs., INS Announces Sus-
pension of Cambodian Adoptions and Offer of Parole in Certain Pending Cases,
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Before continuing further, it is important to note that evidence of
adoption abuses often remains at the level of allegations, not because
abuses are not occurring, but because, like any criminal enterprise, those
who engage in illicit adoption practices must necessarily conceal the true
nature of their activities. 157 It is also important to note that in some cases
these networks maintain their existence through intimidation and outright
violence.
158
In fact, the only country in which a comprehensive investigation of
adoption abuses has occurred is in Cambodia. Bartholet, relegates the Cam-
bodia scandal to a footnote.1 59 This is particularly disturbing because the
evidence obtained in the investigation is extremely detailed and for the most
part, unassailable.
Cambodia
Cambodia is unique because its international adoption practices
were subject to extensive investigation by the U.S. Bureau of Customs and
Immigration Enforcement. 160 The results of the investigation, the charges
filed, and the guilty pleas'16 obtained are all part of the public record. 162 In
December 21, 2001, available at www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/CamAdoptl 2
2101.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
157 Smolin, supra note 55, at 117 (noting that, "abuses of the adoption system
could not last long if they were not usually hidden; these crimes would not exist if
they were not successful in achieving the aims of their perpetrators").
158 See, e.g. Alan Zarembo, A Place to Call Home: The Anger, Tears and Frustrat-
ing Runarounds of a Guatemalan Adoption Case, NEWSWEEK, July 15, 2002, at 27
(reporting case in which machete-wielding men attack a birth father to stop him
from trying to reclaim his child).
159 Bartholet, supra note 2, at 167 and accompanying text.
160 The United States government has not launched formal criminal investigations
into the adoption practices of any other country. See Corbett, supra note 152. The
purpose of the investigation was to determine whether American citizens were in-
volved in any adoption-related crimes. The lead investigator in Cambodia was Im-
migration and Customs Enforcement Senior Special Agent Richard Cross. The
Internal Revenue Service was also involved in the investigation. See U.S. Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement News Release, Woman Sentenced to 18 Months
in Prison for Visa Fraud and Money Laundering in Connection with Cambodian
Adoption Scam, Nov. 19, 2004 , available at http://www.ice.gov/newsreleases.arti-
cles.adoptionscam1 1904.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
161 The chief perpetrator, American adoption facilitator, Lauryn Galindo, pled
guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit visa fraud, one count of conspiracy to
commit money laundering, and one count of structuring transactions to evade re-
porting requirements. See USA v. Lauryn Galindo, No. CR 03-0187Z (W.D.
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addition, those ultimately charged with adoption-related crimes were given
the full panoply of Constitutional due process protections. As a result, the
Cambodia case provides us with the best and most comprehensive look into
the shadowy world of illicit child procurement networks that can operate in
a laxly-regulated system particularly vulnerable to abuse.
163
Cambodia became a hot spot for international adoptions in the late
1990s. 164 Like many countries in which systemic abuses have been alleged,
Cambodian adoptions spiked rapidly. In 1997, 66 Cambodian children
were adopted to the U.S.165 and in 1998 and 1999, the numbers rose almost
Wash. May 6, 2003); No. CR 03-00178DAE (D. Haw. Apr. 9, 2003). She received
three concurrent 18 month prison sentences, 3 years of supervised release and 300
hours of community service. She was also ordered to forfeit the proceeds of her
illegal operations and to make restitution to some of her victims. Id. Although
Galindo pled guilty to only one count of conspiracy to commit visa fraud, lead
investigator Richard Cross stated that she could have been charged with hundreds
of counts. See Cross Lecture, supra note 150.
162 See USA v. Lauryn Galindo, Superseding Indictment No. CR-00187TSZ-1
(W.D. Wash. May 6, 2003); USA v. Lauryn Galindo CR-00270TSZ-1 (W.D.
Wash. June 8, 2004) (Lauryn Galindo indicted for structuring transactions to evade
reporting requirements). For detailed information found relating to Galindo's crimi-
nal activities in Cambodia. See Galindo Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 77.
163 See Corbett, supra note 152. Corbett notes that because of agency attempts to
meet the desires of adoptive parents for the youngest children with the quickest
adoption processing times, agencies often flock to less developed countries where
adoption regulations are loose and the large amounts of money in play are "daz-
zlingly influential."
164 Cambodia had all of the characteristics-particularly, widespread, severe and
intractable poverty, see Smolin, supra note 55, at 124, and lax regulation that
would make it a "hot spot for international adoption." Corbett observed that fertil-
ity rates in Cambodia were among the highest in Southeast Asia. On the other
hand, war, genocide and the ensuing decades of political unrest, coupled with epi-
demic levels of AIDS and tuberculosis rendered Cambodia a dysfunctional society.
See Corbett, supra note 152. See also USAID Cambodia, supra note 46, at 6.
Corbett also observed that Cambodia ha[d] no central registry for births or deaths.
,,record keeping [was] usually done at the village level, if at all, and children gener-
ally [did] not have birth certificates unless they were to be adopted. Id. Currently,
Vietnam and Ethiopia are the international adoption "hot spots." USCIS has re-
ported receiving 2000 I-600A applications stating intention to adopt from Vietnam
(the highest number ever adopted in one year was 820 (2007)); Ethiopia rapidly
escalated in number between 2003 to 2007, showing 166, 277, 430, 711 and 1,255
adoptions respectively.
165 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. Adoption statistics (1990-1995), and DHS Statistics
(1996-2006).
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four hundred percent to 249 children. 166 In 2000, the number nearly
doubled again to 402,167 placing Cambodia as the ninth most popular coun-
try for international adoptions. In 2001, 384 children were placed to the
US,168 prior to the United States' government's adoption suspension. By
the summer of 2001, nearly 100 adoption petitions per month were being
filed. 169 Had the U.S. not effectively stopped most adoptions in October
2001, the number of visas issued would likely have been higher.
170
Although baby-buying allegations surfaced as early as 2000,171 it
was not until 2001 that the situation received extensive attention from the
U.S. authorities. In early September, two Cambodian mothers who at-
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. The 2001 figure is somewhat misleading, however. A number of cases were
in process at the time adoptions closed. In large part as a response to a widespread
public outcry by American adoptive parents caught in the "pipeline," the United
States began a Special Humanitarian Initiative. INS sent teams of investigators to
Cambodian orphanages to inspect paperwork to determine whether children's visa
petitions could be processed to completion. Corbett, supra note 152 (describing
Special Humanitarian Initiative). As a result of the Special Humanitarian initiative
which did not conclude until 2004, an additional 473 children were issued visas.
Immigrant Visas Issue to Orphans, supra note 119. Despite the fact that virtually
all of the cases in the Special Initiative were cleared, a concurrent criminal investi-
gation, discussed in detail in infra notes 169 to 180 and accompanying text, found
widespread evidence of fraudulent and criminal activity. In explaining why so
many of the Special Initiative cases were cleared, INS spokesperson, Bill Strass-
berger's analysis was far from reassuring: due to poor record keeping and endemic
corruption, in his view, "[w]e know that something is not right, but we can't prove
it in U.S. courts under the U.S. systems of justice, we have no choice but to ap-
prove [an application] and allow the child to come in as an orphan." Corbett, supra
note 152. See also Trish Maskew, Child Trafficking and International Adoption:
The Cambodian Experience, 35 CUMB. L. REV. 619 (2005).
169 See Corbett, supra note 152.
170 See Corbett, supra note 152.
171 See, e.g., Stephen O'Connell & Bou Saroeun, Babies Bought for Sale to For-
eigners, PHNOM PENH POST (May 25, 2000) (implicating an orphanage supported
by American facilitator Lauryn Galindo in baby buying schemes) (on file with au-
thor); Stephen O'Connell et al., Big Bribes Key to US baby-buying, PHNOM PENH
POST (Aug. 18-31, 2000) (alleging that American families' adoption fees were used
as bribes and detailing baby-buying incident at same orphanage supported by
American facilitator) (on file with author); Stephen O'Connell & Chea
Sotheacheath, Tourism Officials Quit Ministry to Run Adoption Business, PHNOM
PENH POST (detailing allegations of baby selling at the newly created Asian Or-
phan Association orphanage) (on file with author).
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tempted unsuccessfully to retrieve children whom they had placed tempora-
rily in an orphanage complained to an NGO, The Cambodian League for
the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights (Licadho), that their children
could not be found. 7 2 One of the children was found in the custody of Sea
Visoth, a facilitator operating an orphanage called KAOA. The child had
been given a new identity, had been adopted by an American family under
Cambodian law, and was later determined to be just days away from receiv-
ing a U.S. immediate relative visa.173 In September 2001, Licadho also
raided two private houses, described as "medical clinics" in the Tuol Kork
district of Phnom Penh. There, Licadho found thirteen children: 10 babies
and 3 young children, some of them quite ill, registered to a Cambodian
facilitator, named Serey Puth who owned the Asian Orphans Association
Orphanage.17 4 After the Licadho raid, U.S. Embassy officials began to look
critically at the integrity of pending orphan petitions. 175 Further scrutiny
172 See Corbett, supra note 152. Corbett also tells of an impoverished, pregnant
Cambodian birth mother who sold her daughter to a "medical clinic' in the red light
district of Phnom Penh. The mother was given $50 and promised another $100 the
next week. When the child's aunt learned what had happened, she borrowed $50 at
25% interest per month to buy the child back. The child's birth mother was a
garment worker whose salary fluctuated considerably, depending on the work
available. The mother later sold her son to the same clinic. His whereabouts are
unknown.
173 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Questions and Answers - Adoption Processing in Cam-
bodia, available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/AdopProcCambodia_02
0702.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2008) (noting that, "[a]lthough the Cambodian gov-
ernment already had given permission for this child to be adopted, the supporting
documentation - birth certificate, certificate of abandonment, certificate of orphan
status, and biography of the alleged abandoned child - was false").
174 See Corbett, supra note 152; see also Cambodian League for the Def. and Pro-
motion of Human Rights [LICADHO], Case Summary - Asian Orphan Ass'n
[AOA], 209-10 (Mar. 10, 2004) [hereinafter LICADHO] (on file with author) (re-
porting an impoverished Cambodia mother had asked Licadho to locate her two
missing children whom she had relinquished to a children's center, but had not
allowed to reclaim. Licadho did not find the children among the thirteen it located
at the "clinic," but the next day, an AOA representative returned her children to her
at a Phnom Penh police station. The Cambodian courts returned the other children
to AOA's custody. Later, the mother signed a document presented to her by a
"lawyer" in which she withdrew her complaint against AOA. Interestingly, the
mother was illiterate).
175 LICAHDO Report, supra note 174, at 210 (noting that there were many incon-
sistencies in the orphanage and official documents relating to the 12 children. The
names and dates of birth on the Ministry and AOA documents did not match). The
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revealed that virtually all of the paperwork filed in support of orphan peti-
tions listed the child as abandoned with unknown birth parents.1 76 This
identical paperwork, coupled with the Licadho reports, raised a number of
red flags. In November, the United States began conducting field investiga-
tions to verify the orphan status of adopted children.1 77 These investiga-
tions indicated that adoption paperwork (and other irregularities) made it
impossible to determine whether a child was, in fact, an orphan. 78 The INS
suspended adoptions from Cambodia on December 21, 2001.179
In early 2002, the United States government sent two Customs and
Immigration Enforcement agents to Cambodia to investigate adoption prac-
tices.8 0 The investigation, code-named "Operation Broken Hearts,"'' was
launched in part because the leading adoption facilitator in Cambodia,
Lauryn Galindo, was an American citizen. 182 Galindo is estimated to have
completed over 800 adoptions (or almost 80% of all Cambodian adoptions
since 1990) and to have grossed nearly 9.2 million dollars in adoption
United States began an informal slowdown of adoption processing in October 2001
that lasted until adoptions were formally suspended on December 21, 2001.
176 Corbett, supra note 152.
177 INS spokesperson Bill Strassberger stated, "[d]ocuments didn't match up, sig-
natures were forged. The paperwork would say babies had been abandoned in a
certain village, and then an investigation would show that no baby had been aban-
doned there for years." Corbett, supra note 152.
178 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 173 (explaining that documentation irregu-
larities made it impossible for INS investigators to, "determine that the prospective
adoptive children have been made available for international adoption under cir-
cumstances that meet the requirements of U.S. immigration laws").
179 INS Press Release, supra note 156. Then INS Commission Zigler stated,
"INS' responsibility to determine that a child is truly an orphan must never be
tainted by any action that results in the exploitation of innocent children by separat-
ing them from their biological families as a result of fraud, trafficking in human
beings or other criminal activity."
180 Cross Lecture, supra note 150. Cross spent two months in Cambodia investi-
gating whether any American citizens were involved in illegal activities involving
adoptions. Originally Cross investigated whether children had been kidnapped for
adoption. Although there is no evidence that the Galindo organization engaged in
kidnapping, Cross immediately found evidence of significant federal crimes includ-
ing visa fraud.
181 U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, Backgrounder, supra note
151.
182 U.S. citizens are often not directly involved in the foreign country, making it
difficult for U.S. authorities to investigate or prosecute offenders.
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fees. 183 Federal investigators obtained considerable evidence that Galindo
and her organization engaged in widespread solicitation and purchase of
children for adoption. 184 After executing search warrants in the U.S., lead
investigator Richard Cross found numerous post-it notes in Galindo's house
detailing money Galindo paid as "nurse care" for adopted children.
185
Nurse care, according to Cross, was a euphemism for either care for a birth
mother prior to adoption or money paid by a recruiter for a child. 186 Impov-
erished birth parents were offered as little as $15, and sometimes as little as
a bag of rice, for their children. "Helpers," some of whom had sold their
children earlier and convinced other birth parents to do the same, purchased
children from their parents. 187 The helpers turned the children over to
recruiters who sold the children to orphanages for about $300-$400 each.
188
Before children were accepted into orphanages, they and sometimes their
birth parents were taken to a clinic in Phnom Penh, where they were tested
for, HIV, Hepatitis A, B, C, and Syphilis. 89 Children who tested positive
were returned to their birth families.
Galindo's recruiters induced consents from birth parents by promis-
ing that the American adoptive families would send money to the family in
Cambodia and that when the child turned eighteen, he or she would support
the family and sponsor them for emigration to the US.190 Shockingly,
photos that adoptive parents were required to send to Cambodia to report on
the well-being of the child were used on recruitment posters to convince
other Cambodian parents to relinquish their children.19'
Galindo's staff created a false identity - including false names,
false birthplaces, and false birth certificates and abandonment papers - for
each child. 192 According to Cross, all of the paperwork submitted in sup-
port of each child's visa application was false.193 The Cambodian children
adopted to the U.S. through Galindo were effectively laundered. In some
cases, one false identity was switched for another, all in order to enable
183 See Galindo Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 77, at 28.
184 Cross Lecture, supra note 150.
185 Cross Lecture, supra note 150.
186 Cross Lecture, supra note 150.
187 Id.; see also, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, Backgrounder,
supra note 151.
188 Cross Lecture, supra note 150.
189 Id. Cross Lecture, supra note 150.
190 Id. Cross Lecture, supra note 150.
191 Id. Cross Lecture, supra note 150.
192 Id.; see also Galindo Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 77, at 20.
193 Cross Lecture, supra note 150.
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Galindo to maintain a steady flow of easy and highly lucrative adoptive
placements.1 94 Galindo's staff also bribed numerous officials in the Cambo-
dia government to sign off on fraudulent paperwork. 95
While only U.S. citizen Galindo was prosecuted, investigators have
stated that they believe all other adoption facilitators in Cambodia engaged
in similar practices to one degree or another. 196 Because child trafficking for
purposes of international adoption is not criminalized under federal law, the
only adoption fraud-related crime with which Galindo could be charged
was conspiracy to commit visa fraud. 197 And this was only possible in cases
where adoptive parents could offer credible evidence in support of the visa
fraud allegations.
Creating Orphans?
While some, including Bartholet, might argue that the Cambodia
case is merely an aberration, the abuses so thoroughly documented there are
remarkably consistent with concerns raised in other countries, most recently
Guatemala and Vietnam. Bartholet speaks in glowing terms of the private
system in Guatemala, because it places large numbers of infants in the rela-
tively short time frame of 6-8 months from a privately controlled foster care
system that often avoids institutionalization altogether. 98 In Bartholet's
view, Guatemala is a model system; she bemoans the fact that not only is
the Guatemalan system not the norm, it is under attack from organizations
like UNICEF. 199
194 USA v. Lauryn Galindo, Superseding Indictment, supra note 162, at 2-4, 6-9
(describing baby switches).
195 Cambodia Daily, supra note 153; see also, Galindo Sentencing Memorandum,
supra note 77, at 8 (statement of Dr. Kek Galabru of LICADHO) (noting that,
"[t]here should be no doubt that the payments made to Cambodian ministry clerks,
employees or officials in order to facilitate the adoption process in Cambodia...
are bribes. There are no Cambodian government fees for the processing of adop-
tion") (emphasis added).
196 Cross Lecture, supra note 150.
197 The U.S. government, however, referred to this as a "child trafficking" enter-
prise. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, Backgrounder, supra
note 151. Galindo was also charged with and pled guilty to conspiracy to Launder
Money and Structuring Financial Transactions. She was ordered to forfeit the pro-
ceeds of her crimes to the government, along with her home in Hawaii worth $1.4
million and her $25,000 Jaguar. ICE News Release, supra note 160.
198 Bartholet, supra note 2, at 156-57.
199 Bartholet, supra note 2, at 156-57.
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Bartholet's choice of Guatemala is curious, because allegations of
baby buying, kidnapping, and other illicit practices in Guatemala have cir-
culated for years.200 Guatemala does have an orphanage population in the
thousands, but these children have virtually no chance to be adopted.20' In-
stead, the children adopted from Guatemala come primarily from a private
system developed by Guatemalan attorneys and foreign agencies. Prospec-
tive adoptive parents contract with U.S. agencies, which, in turn, have con-
tracts with Guatemalan attorneys. 20 2 The attorneys operate a network of
200 See, e.g., Hague Conference on Private International Law, Report and Conclu-
sions of the Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the Hague Conven-
tion of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, 28 November-i December 2000, 28-29 (reporting that sev-
eral states and organizations expressed concern about Guatemalan adoptions);
ILPEC Guatemala supra note 59; See also, e.g., Zarembo, supra note 158; Jan
McGirk, Guatemala Starts Crackdown on Illegal Baby Trade, THE INDEPENDENT,
Apr. 5, 2000, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/
guatemala-starts-crackdown-on-illegal-baby-trade-719128.html (last visited Apr.
12, 2008).
201 ILPEC Guatemala, supra note 59, at 56:
In all of Guatemala, there are approximately 300 institutions,
housing an estimated 23,000-25,000 children, the majority of
whom have been abandoned alongside of some who have been
placed temporarily as a protective measure. These institutions are
saturated with children who are not being adopted. It would be
worthwhile to further investigate this circumstance since those
actually being adopted are, to a large extent, being "produced"
for this end, while those who are truly in need of a family are
being condemned to institutionalization until they reach the age
of adulthood. It is also necessary to consider that the majority of
institutionalized children are awaiting a formal abandonment rul-
ing which can take up to seven years.
See also Jennifer Banks, Note, The U.S. Market for Guatemalan Children: Sugges-
tions for Slowing Down the Rapid Growth of Illegal Practices Plaguing Interna-
tional Child Adoption, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 31, 40 (2004) (stating
that, "[i]ntemational adoptions comprise ninety-five to ninety-eight percent of all
adoptions of Guatemalan children and virtually all of these adoptions take place
through an extrajudicial notary system").
202 The cost of a Guatemalan adoption is high, even by international adoption stan-
dards: Adoptive parents pay fees of $20,000 and more (U.S.) See, e.g., ILPEC
Guatemala, supra note 59, at 40 (citing U.S. Embassy compiled figures showing
cost of Guatemalan adoption was $23,000, of which $15,000 went to Guatemalan
attorney [in 2000]); Banks, supra note 201, at 38 (in 2004, fees for a Guatemalan
adoption ranged from $12,000 to over $20,000).
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private foster homes and orphanages. Credible reports abound that the attor-
neys find children for adoption by paying a jaladore, or child finder, from
$5,000 to $10,000 per child to locate children for international adoption.
20 3
The jaladores often provide money to the birth parent in amounts ranging
from several hundred to up to $2,000 USD. 20 4 Over the years, as the num-
ber of Guatemalan adoptions have risen to record levels,20 5 allegations that
women are intentionally becoming pregnant and placing children for adop-
tion in order to receive payments have multiplied. 20 6 Substantiated reports
203 The existence of jaladores has been confirmed since 2000 when the ILPEC
report was published. See ILPEC of Guatemala, supra note 59, at 49 ("Presently,
there exists a sector of middlemen or "jaladoras" who act as intermediaries in the
trafficking of children, actively seeking out pregnant women in the markets, parks,
buses, or among groups of street girls and offering them sums up to Q. 5,000.00 for
their future baby"). In 2007, the Hague Conference sent a delegation to Guatemala
and documented their findings in Report of a Fact-Finding Mission to Guatemala
in Relation to Intercountry Adoption 26 February - 9 March 2007. Hague Confer-
ence on Private International Law, Report of a Fact-Finding Mission to Guatemala
in Relation to Intercountry Adoption 26 February 9 March 2007, available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/missiongt33e.pdf. They define a jaladora as a
person who traces pregnant women or women with small or very young children to
convince them to relinquish their children for money. Jaladores may include a
physician, social worker, nurse, teacher, community member, etc. Id. at 7.
204 Hague Conference, Fact Finding Mission, reporting on the work of jaladores,
and including a story of a woman offered 20,000 Quetzal for her child, which
is approximately $2600. http://finance.yahoo.com/currency/convert?amt=l &from=
USD&to=GTQ); ILPEC, 2000 (reporting payments of approximately $700 USD).
205 Adoptions from Guatemala rapidly rose: 1609 (2001); 2419 (2002), 2328
(2003), 3264 (2004), 3783 (2005), 4135 (2006), 4,728 (2007) In FY 2006 and
2007, Guatemala jumped ahead of Russia to become the second most popular
sending country (behind China) for adoptions to the US. Dep't of State Statistics,
supra note 58. Guatemala has the highest per capita adoption rate in the world, with
1 out of every 100 children bom in Guatemala coming to the United States for
adoption. In 2006, Guatemala report 368, 910 births and 4,135 children were
placed in the United States (or 1.1%) www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbagg.
206 See Bartholet, supra note 2, at 188. See also Guatemala Starts Crackdown on
Illegal Baby Trade, The Independent, April 5, 2000 available at http://www.inde-
pendent. co. uklnews/world/americas/guatemala-starts-crackdwn-on-illegal-baby"
trade-719128.html (citing Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, a UN childcare official who vis-
ited Guatemala City, said poor women were often "contracted" to produce babies
and give them away"); McGirk, supra note 183; Dr. James White, M.D., GSSG
News, Vol. IV, No. 1 (Feb. 2006)(reporting on thirteen year old patient purposely
impregnated to produce child for adoption in Guatemala, and subsequent investiga-
tion revealing existence of residence housing many other teen girls in same situa-
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of child abduction for international adoption have surfaced in Guatemala. In
response, the U.S. government has instituted requirements for two DNA
tests during the adoption process;20 7 however, while DNA tests may prevent
abducted children from being granted visas, they cannot determine whether
illicit payments occurred in the adoption process. Recently, very similar
allegations have arisen in Vietnam with documented reports of child find-
ers, 20 8 payments for children, 20 9 child abduction, and the erasure of
identities.
210
The situations in Guatemala, Vietnam, and Cambodia raise signifi-
cant concerns about whether these systems found homes for children in
need or instead, created paper orphans whom, absent payments, might not
have been made available for adoption. 21' The available evidence, at least
tion); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: PROSPECTIVE
ADOPTIVE PARENTS OF GUATEMALAN CHILDREN, available at http://travel.state.
gov/family/adoption/convention/convention_3170.html#3 (last visited Mar. 30,
2008) (discussing problems in Guatemala and the psychological harm that can
come to children who "discover that he, and perhaps siblings, were produced for
the sole purpose of adoption").
207 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. Embassy in Guatemala Adds Second DNA Test to
adoption procedure, available at http://travel.state.gov/family/adoption/intercoun-
try/intercountry_3751.html (a second procedure was added after reports that some
DNA results had been proven false).
208 U.S. EMBASSY, Adopted Children Immigrant Visa Unit, Announcement Regard-
ing Adoption in Vietnam, available at http://vietnam.usembassy.gov/adoptionstate-
mentl 107.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2008) (citing "insufficient control of so-called
child finders"); Vietnam Embassy Report, supra note 90 (outlining activities by
finders).
209 Vietnam Embassy Report, supra note 90.
210 Vietnam Embassy Report, supra note 90.
211 The American Ambassador to Cambodia in 2001 remarked that growing inter-
est in Cambodian adoption had caused new orphanages to be built stocked "with
infants seemingly expressly ordered to meet American tastes." Corbett, supra note
152. The Asian Orphan Association facility, completed in 2000, housed 157 chil-
dren under age 1. Ninety-five or nearly two-thirds of the infants were girls. Id.
The evidence shows that American adoptive parents overwhelmingly prefer girls.
See Gravois, supra note 60. In contrast, the state-run orphanage, The Nutrition
Center in central Phnom Penh housed a large number of older disabled children as
well as AIDS affected infants. Corbett, supra note 152. It is clear then, that the
Cambodian "adoption population" differed significantly from the state run orphan-
age population. This fact was confirmed by a survey undertaken by Holt Interna-
tional in 2005, which found that between the shutdown and 2005, the number of
infants and toddlers in Cambodian orphanages did not increase, and indeed would
not have met US demand for children in 2001. In 2005, only 329 children under
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in these countries, suggests the latter. For instance, one humanitarian aid
group founded by parents who adopted from Cambodia ceased operations
in the fall of 2007 when it announced that there were simply not enough
orphans to justify the organization's continued involvement in Cambodia.212
Recently, a U.S. agency traveled to Vietnam and reported that there were
few young babies available and that the children who needed adoption were
older and had special needs. 213 Yet, reports indicate that the majority of
children placed from Vietnam are infants. The U.S. Embassy notes that
with the reopening of Vietnam-U.S. adoptions, some orphanages exper-
ienced a 2000 percent increase in the number of "deserted" children enter-
ing institutions.214 In Guatemala, virtually all international adoptions
involve children relinquished directly by their parents and placed into foster
care pending international placement, not children in orphanages.2 15 These
situations strongly suggest that the presence of inadequately regulated adop-
tion programs in these countries has resulted in children being placed into,
not removed from, institutional and foster care. When the adoption option is
removed, the number of children in such institutions drops, sometimes
precipitously.
216
age three were in orphanage care; whereas more than 75% of children were over
the age of 9 and thus, ineligible for placement for adoption. See USAID Cambodia,
supra note 46, at 8; see also Smolin, supra note 55, at 145-46:
The Cambodian orphanage survey suggests that most of the chil-
dren who were adopted internationally from Cambodia were a
distinct population of children, separate from Cambodia's orphan
population. Demographically, Cambodian adoptees were
predominantly female infants and toddlers, while Cambodia's or-
phanage population is overwhelmingly children nine and older,
and predominantly male.
212 Posting of Elizabeth Mallory, supra note 55 (stating that her organization, No
Child Left Out, was closing its Cambodian orphanage program in fall 2007 because
of lack of orphans, which she defined as children without any parents).
213 Leonette Biorski, Pearl S. Buck International, A Visit to Vietnam, available at
http://www.psbi.org/site/PageServer?pagename=WHNewsletterHTMLNov07
(last visited Apr. 14, 2008) (noting that "although there are some infants available,
the majority of the children are older or have special needs").
214 Vietnam Embassy Report, supra note 90.
215 See Banks, supra note 201 and accompanying text.
216 For instance, compare USAID Cambodia, supra note 46, at 3-4 (numbers and
ages of orphans) with Cambodian international adoption statistics, supra notes 164
68 and accompanying text and Corbett figures on children at AOA, supra note
211. See also Corbett, supra note 152 (stating that "if birth parents knew Phornn's
village as a friendly place to abandon infants, then word curiously seemed to spread
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These facts raise disturbing questions that must be answered in de-
veloping or critiquing an adoption regulatory scheme. Are "desirable" chil-
dren being placed into institutional care as a way station to adoption? Are
the families who are relinquishing such children being provided with any
support to parent their children? Does international adoption have any pal-
pable effect in reducing the numbers of older and disabled children in care
or would the vast majority of these children continue to comprise the major-
ity of the orphanage population, even if international adoptions were con-
ducted in the largely unregulated manner that Bartholet advocates?
If, as in the case of Guatemala, the vast majority of adopted chil-
dren are not actually institutionalized children or street children, then the
dichotomy that Bartholet presents of children being adopted internationally
or "living and dying in institutions or on the streets" might often change to
"living with their families of birth or being adopted internationally." Then,
the choices, and the moral questions those choices raise, are not so easily
defined or answered. Instead, they raise an entire spectrum of additional
human rights issues that Bartholet, for all intents and purposes, ignores.
PART V: WHY THE FULL HUMAN RIGHTS PICTURE MATTERS
Why do any of the ethical concerns raised in this article matter? If
we accept Bartholet's contention that the key human rights issue in interna-
tional adoption is moving the millions of orphans languishing in damaging
institutions and on the streets as quickly as possible into adoptive homes,
these concerns should at best be relegated to the periphery.
When, however, we strip away the emotional but overly simplistic
appeal of her language, many of the more problematic aspects of
Bartholet's position become clear. Leaving aside the racist and colonialist
notions that some see in positions like hers, 217 it is by no means clear that
following the U.S. suspension, that the Asian Orphan Association was no longer
accepting children.").
217 For articles critiquing positions like Bartholet's, see, e.g., Twila L. Perry,
Transracial and International Adoption: Mothers, Hierarchy, Race, and Feminist
Legal Theory, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 101, 135 (1998). Perry notes:
As troubling as it may be for many to admit, a conception of
poor, third-world countries as subordinate nations fits very com-
fortably with the practice of international adoption. This kind of
view translates easily into the idea that Western adoptive parents
are simply saving unfortunate third-world children by bringing
them out of primitive, impoverished and disease-ridden countries
into the more affluent life that the West can offer. It permits a
discourse that allows Westerners to take the high ground and por-
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international adoption, if it occurs early enough, actually results in rela-
tively uncomplicated adoptee adjustment. Nor is it at all clear that adoption
abuses have no consequences on those affected.
Bartholet claims that critics of international adoption radically over-
estimate the importance of cultural continuity and heritage. 218 Indeed, for
her, the street child and the institutionalized child will never participate
meaningfully in the cultural lives of their communities; therefore, the sup-
posed harm of removing these children from their communities of origin is
clearly outweighed by the good achieved by placement with "loving fami-
lies. '219 Bartholet claims that not only are internationally adopted children
well adjusted, but they have, to a greater extent than non-adoptees, the ad-
ded unique advantage of being able to straddle multiple worlds.220
Bartholet's claims about the degree of identity integration among
international adoptees must be balanced against the growing body of work
by international adoptees, much of which chronicles alienation both from
birth and adoptive cultures, significant identity and role confusion, and
profound degrees of depression and anger over the loss of identity, family
and heritage. Much of this discourse is recent and much of it has been
produced by Vietnamese and Korean adoptees, the cohort of international
adoptees now old enough to reflect critically on their experiences.2 21 These
adult adoptees paint a decidedly different, and more complicated, picture of
their own experiences than Bartholet does. As Ami Inja Mafzger observes:
tray their international adoptions as simple acts of humanitarian-
ism and altruism.
See also INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: A MULTINATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 93, (Howard
Alstein & Rita J. Simon eds.) (1991) (discussing imperialist implications of interna-
tional adoption).
218 Bartholet, supra note 2, at 180.
219 Bartholet, supra note 2, at 181.
220 Bartholet, supra note 2, at 179-80.
221 Adult adoptee groups provide resources and support to adoptees and their fami-
lies. See, e.g., Vietnamese Adoptee Network, http://www.van-online.org/Re-
sources/Links.aspx; Adopted Vietnamese International, http://www.darlo.tvfindigo/
Vietnaml .html;Korean American Adoptee, Adoptive Family Network, http://www.
kaanet.com/; Korean Adoptees Worldwide, http://www.geocities.com/Tokyo/
Shrine/8654/kaw.html. The blogosphere is home to numerous blogs by adult
adoptees who share their thoughts on their adoptions, culture, and the attitudes of
adoptive parents and agencies. See, e.g., Jae Ran Kim, Harlow's Monkey, available
at http://harlowmonkey.typepad.com/; Jane Jeong Trenka, Jane's blog, available at
http://harlowmonkey.typepad.corn/; Sunny Jo Johnsen (Park Young-Joo) available
at http://www.geocities.com/sunnyjo888/.
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When people of color grow up in a predominantly white society, its
difficult to realize that being different doesn't mean that one measures up
any less-especially when there is little to explain how one is different, and
any reinforcement given about being different is negative ... I grew up in
Minong, Wisconsin, a small town of 500 people. There I was called racist
names such as chink, jap and nigger. I was even told to go back to my own
country. I didn't understand what the words meant but I could feel the re-
jection by others tied to my appearance. I always knew I was different and
did not like it one bit. I wanted to explain myself, but I didn't have the
knowledge of who I was myself, nor could my family teach me about my
background.
222
Adoptees also speak eloquently and with great insight about their
struggles with their sense of loss and the sometimes deliberate, but often
unexamined, silencing of their experience as adoptees.
At a certain point [the adopteel may recognize that it is not
permitted to express her sadness, grief or even disapproval
with the decisions that have been made for her... At the
moment I have decided that I may feel deeply the loss of
my biological parents, extended family, village, native lan-
guage, food, customs, solid trees, fields, rivers, streams,
sea, ancestor's graves and the places where my umbilical
cord was cut and my placenta buried, while still enjoying
and marveling in the love of my adopted parents, siblings,
health, education and other opportunities. I feel my ever-
present loss which in some days is as tangible as a taste
on the tongue, a whispered breeze on the skin, a pain in the
stomach, a breathlessness, a nausea, a mal du pays, a home-
sickness, an empty place at the table - will and should never
be ignored or denied, and to speak of this loss is not to be
ungrateful, or unappreciative, or unthankful for my chance
to live.2
23
To argue, then, that reconciliation of the irreconcilable of the un-
wanted "chosen child" is a relatively uncomplicated process, is to grossly
simplify and disrespect the significant struggles faced by adoptees.2 2 4
222 Ami Inja Nafzgar, Proud to be Me, in OUTSIDERS WITHIN: WRITINGS ON
TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 233 (Jane Jeong Trenka et al., eds.) (2006).
223 Rachel Quy Collier, Performing Childhood, in OUTSIDERS WITHIN, supra note
222, at 210-11.
224 See, e.g., Betty Jean Lifton, JOURNEY OF THE ADOPTED SELF: A QUEST FOR
WHOLENESS 11 (1994) (discussing genealogical bewilderment of adopted chil-
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Indeed, adoptees who do question the, "assimilation is healthy as-
sumption" are often considered unhealthy and abnormal. '225 Few people
would expect an international adoptee to be grateful for being "saved."
However, when the angry adult adoptee is pathologized or marginalized
within her presumably psychologically healthy cohort, it is difficult to see
how to see how rejection of the mythology of healthy, uncomplicated ad-
justment is not actually a more pernicious labeling of the adoptee as
ungrateful.
2 6
Thus, as the voices of adult adoptees show us, the "saved" children
grow up; they become thinking, feeling, and articulate human beings. The
data show unequivocally that questions of identity, origins, and relinquish-
ment are highly salient, and sometimes highly problematic. The inability to
answer these questions inflicts profound, long-lasting damage. In this con-
text, then, the evils of laundering children to erase their identities or render-
ing them fungible commodities become clear.
Some of Bartholet's fellow adoptive parents also acknowledge the
difficulties that many adult adoptees face, and how important it is for adop-
dren); Toby Alice Volkman, Embodying Chinese Culture: Transnational Adoption
in North America, 74 Soc. TEXT 29, 48-49 (2003) (discussing growing awareness
among professional social work community of grief issues faced by adopted chil-
dren, even those adopted in early infancy).
225 Kirsten hoo-Mi Sloth, Researching Adoption, in OUTSIDERS WITHIN, supra note
222 at 254.
226 See, e.g., Ji In Lutgo, "Beyond Good Intentions," Twice the Rice blog (June 28,
2006) available at http://twicetherice.wordpress.com/2006/06/28/beyond-good-in-
tentions/ (commenting on the hate mail received from adoptive parents when she
posted her experience); Sumeia Williams, "Well-adjusted", NY Times, December
1, 2007 available at http://relativechoices.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/12/01/well-ad-
justed/#more-29:
When I first started reading about adoption, I kept coming across
the words "well-adjusted adoptee." In 1970s the thinking was that
adoptees should be content with their present lives and not think
about their adoptions. . .Questions beyond childhood curiosity
and looking anything other than "happy" would get you labeled
as having psychological problems or "issues.".. .Today, it's more
acceptable for adoptees to question, to seek answers and even
mourn their losses as some of us often do. As long as we eventu-
ally come to some sense of "peace" and go about our daily lives,
all is well. It isn't until some of us become critical that we are
confronted by a revised version of "maladjusted." This new term
implies the same thing as the old but with a twist. We've come to
be known as "the bitter, angry adoptees.
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tive parents to examine old attitudes and rethink assumptions that adoption
is always positive.
22 7
At this point, a word about birth families is also in order. Bartholet
contends that birth families relinquish their children because they simply
have no choice. 228 In reality, the voices of the poor and powerless are rarely
heard,22 9 and in the majority of cases, we simply do not know why a child
227 See, e.g., Cheri Register, Beyond Good Intentions, a Mother Reflects on Raising
Internationally Adopted Children (2005). Register notes in her introduction:
I too have been listening to the voices of adult adoptees. They
testify to the strengths and faults of adoptive family life on In-
temet lists and websites, at conferences on international adoption,
and in poetry, memoirs, and documentary films. Their voices are
on the leading edge of adoption literature, claiming the fertile
ground where new truths arise to squeeze out the old, tired ones.
Many of the voices are critical, and some of the testimony is dif-
ficult for parents to hear... Nevertheless, we parents are eager to
join the conversation, and we are accustomed to setting the terms.
I watched this happen at the publication reading of Jane Jeong
Trenka's memoir, The Language of Blood.. .adoptees in the au-
dience affirmed Trenka's account of her childhood in rural Min-
nesota and her reunion with her Korean birth family; they added
their own stories, which were sometimes halted in mid sentence
by tears. Some of the adoptive parents seemed perplexed and dis-
tressed by this emotional intensity. They homed their questions in
on the reasons for it and even tried to explain it away. An earnest
couple, prospective parents waiting for a child from Guatemala,
asked what they could do differently to make life turn out well
for their own child so she would not end up sad or angry-in
other words, like Jane and the adoptees in the audience.
228 Bartholet, supra note 2, at 187.
229 Galindo Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 77 at 17 (statement of Dr. Kek
Galabru of LICADHO):
Licadho seeks to offer a voice for a particular group of victims -
Cambodian birth families of the children concerned -- which
would otherwise not be heard. Because the defendant's visa
fraud crimes obscured the identities and origins of the children,
these birth families have not been identified and cannot speak for
themselves ..... It is known that at least some of the children in
adoptions in question had birth families. It is most unlikely that
any of these families had formally consented in circumstances
complying with U.S. or Cambodian law - to relinquish their chil-
dren for international adoption. Now they must suffer the loss of
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became available for adoption internationally or how the birth family actu-
ally perceives the decision to relinquish. We need much more empirical
data230 about how birth parents decide -or even if they decide2 31 - to re-
linquish children before it is credible to assume, as Bartholet does, that the
poor and destitute have no choice but relinquishment.
232
Finally, the effects of adoption abuse and fraud on the integrity of
the adoptive family require consideration. In many cases, children who
were victims of adoption abuses are too young to have discovered, or to be
told of, questionable practices that may have surrounded their adoptions.
23
But for thoughtful parents and adoptees alike, the possibility that a family
was founded upon a dishonest or criminal act has profound consequences
both in the present and the future. Once again, the Cambodia case offers us
the best evidence. Dr. Kek Galabru of Licadho noted in her letter to the
sentencing judge that, "the American adoptive parents have been caused by
the defendants to become complicit in visa fraud and have suffered distress
which will mount as their children grow older and ask questions about their
origins and circumstances of their adoption.
' 234
Adoptive parents submitted numerous victim impact statements to
the court prior to Galindo's sentencing.235 The statements provide at least
these children for the rest of their lives, with no practical means
of obtaining redress.
230 For one of the few examples of empirical research on birth parents in the inter-
national adoption context, in this case China, see Bhabha, supra note 38, at 186:
Much less information exists on the circumstances of birth
mothers themselves and whether they voluntarily relinquish their
babies . .According to one study of over 600 families who had
adopted or abandoned Chinese-born children, the vast majority of
abandoning parents were married and from rural areas, almost
90% of abandoned babies were female, and birthmothers fre-
quently expressed emotional pain and remorse for the act.
231 See Vietnam Embassy Report, supra note 90, (relating incidents of children
being processed for adoption without parental consent).
232 Bartholet, supra note 2, at 187.
233 Many of the Cambodian children are 7-11 years old at present; the same is true
of many of the children from Vietnam and Guatemala.
234 Galindo Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 77, at 19 (statement of Dr. Kek
Galabru).
235 See Galindo Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 77, at 19-23. In fairness, it
should also be noted, that the record also includes at least 64 letters of support for
Galindo from adoptive parents. Many of the letters speak of Galindo's selflessness
and apparent concern for Cambodian children. See USA v. Laur.n Galindo, No.
CR-030187Z (W.D. Washington, No. CR03-00178DAE (D. Haw. Apr. 9, 2003));
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some insight into the effect of adoption abuses, at least on the adoptive
parents. One adoptive parent contributed a lengthy statement to the court in
which she detailed how Galindo coerced her into paying what she believed
was gift to her child's nanny, only to discover later that she had made a
payment to her child's mother. 236 The adoptive parent noted that the effects
of this act, coupled with the false representations about the child's identity
that Galindo made, have affected her subsequent parenting:
The circumstances of Pheary's adoption did make it more
difficult for me to bond with her in the beginning. I was
full of guilt and suffered great depression over the knowl-
edge that Pheary already had a family. I still have days
when I feel guilt and ambivalence over what I have done by
bringing Pheary to America and taking her away from her
biological family.
237
If the data are correct, that even a relatively uncomplicated adop-
tion raises significant identity issues and difficulties, then it appears almost
certain that as the children of Cambodia, Guatemala, Vietnam, and other
countries implicated in fraudulent or criminal adoption practices grow up,
their journeys will be far more complicated and painful than those of their
predecessors. Nor should the effects of years of grief, worry and guilt on
the parent/child bond be underestimated, even though their full effects will
not be fully known for years.
Defense Memorandum Describing Exhibit A, Support Letters from Adoptive Fami-
lies (Nov. 10, 2004); Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum No. CR03-187Z
(2004) Appendices. The court, however, did not find these statements of Galindo's
humanitarian motivations persuasive. See ICE News Release, supra note 160:
At the sentencing hearing, Galindo's defense attorney argued that
the Judge should consider his client's charitable work and mental
state and sentence his client to probation. Judge Zilly rejected
these arguments saying her "charitable work made it possible to
commit the crimes" and noting that while there had been a great
deal of discussion about Galindo's childhood trauma, his concern
was the trauma suffered by children "ripped from their parents
and robbed of their identities."
236 Galindo Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 77, at 21 (statement of Catherine
Last).
237 Id. at 21 (statement of Catherine Last).
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CONCLUSION
At the end of the day, Bartholet's argument is a factually unsup-
ported, analytically simplistic justification for what is, in reality, the pro-
foundly problematic institution of international adoption. She does not
address any of the complexities involved in determining the true number of
adoptable children. She offers no analysis or evidence in support of her
claim that existing laws provide an effective safety net against abuse. She
underestimates, perhaps radically, the true incidence of adoption abuses;
and she incorrectly assumes that saving children from the streets or institu-
tions is all that is necessary. It is irresponsible to begin the analysis, as
Bartholet does, by looking at the end of the international adoption process.
Before we can assess the utility of international adoption as a child welfare
institution, and certainly before we can make authoritative claims about
ideal adoption systems, we must answer the hard, empirical questions that
Bartholet ignores. We cannot responsibly conclude that a child must be
adopted internationally before we know how the child got to the orphanage,
where his or her parents are, and whether the cause of the family separation
is permanent and cannot be remedied in a less radical manner than moving
the child from its original family and culture to another. As our analysis
has shown, the current system, in too many cases, simply does not allow us
to answer these questions with any degree of confidence.
